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I. INTRODUCTION
Public debate over the fate of the Legal Services Corporation (LSC) has grown
increasingly political, with Reagan Administration officials continuing to call for the
total elimination of this poverty law program.' Newly appointed LSC officers have
seized regional office files in an attempt to investigate the propriety of regional
managers' activities. 2 They have proposed and adopted regulations restricting LSC
attorneys' representational and nonrepresentational activities. 3 Most recently, LSC
has proposed regulations restricting financial eligibility of applicants for a program
which once stressed the need for local communities to set such standards. 4 Our
Article will focus less on the political than on the more thoughtful debate between
two traditionally divergent groups in the Legal Services community, whom we will
call law reform advocates and equal access defenders. While the positions these
groups espouse are often used to justify restrictions or expansions in the LSC man-
1. See, e.g., 127 CONG. REC. H2968 (daily ed. June 16, 1981) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier); Gest, Deep
Discord Hobbles Legal Aid for Poor, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Oct. 31, 1983, at 66; N.Y. Times, Dec. 24, 1982, at
B4, col. 3; and Nov. 14, 1981, at 8, col.4.
President Reagan has been supported in his efforts by conservative groups who wish to eliminate LSC. See Heritage
Foundation Mandate for Leadership Project Team Report-The Poverty Agencies: Community Services Administration,
Legal Services Corporation, Action 17, 28 (lst draft, Oct. 22, 1980). The report suggested that failing abolition of the
LSC, the Administration should abandon case limitation restrictions and aim restrictions at class actions, support centers,
and budget cuts to "limit L.S.C. lawyers to representing individuals in individual lawsuits." Id. See also OFFICE OF
MANAGEMENT & BuDGET, REPORT ON LEGAL SERVICES 1-3, 46 (June 4, 1981) [hereinafter cited as OMB REPORT]. By
contrast to the Heritage Foundation report, this transition team report did not recommend abolition of LSC but rather
reduction of appropriations, a requirement of more funding forjudicare and private bar models of delivering legal services
to the poor, abolition of support centers, and removal of the presumptive right of refunding. Other suggestions were to
allow gubernatorial vetoes over grantees, to decentralize LSC by region or state, or to require clients to pay five to 10% of
the cost of representation. Apparently, the transition team ignored the results of the LSC Delivery Systems Study of 1980,
which found that judicare models are either too costly or too limited to serve clients and that pro bono models work well
only when there is a staff component. LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION, THE DELIVERY SYsTMiS STuDY 6-11 (1980). The
report also ignored the previous history of Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) problems with local vetoes or
defunding rights. See infra notes 6 and 12.
2. See, e.g, TIME, Oct. 3, 1983, at 83; Gest, supra note I, at 66.
3. LSC's representational activities have been restricted with the passage of new eligibility requirements for alien
clients. A written attestation of the client's citizenship is required. See Act of Dec. 21, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-377, 1982
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws (96 Stat.) 1830. The use of any continuing resolution funds on eases already in progress
for alien clients who fail to meet the new eligibility guidelines is prohibited. The rule offers Legal Services lawyers a guide
for withdrawing under such circumstances from the case of an ineligible client; yet the potential ethical problems are
apparent. See Restrictions on Legal Assistance to Aliens, 48 Fed. Reg. 19,750 (1983) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt.
1626).
LSC has sought to regulate subgranting of its funds to third parties by requiring prior approval for subgranting in
some cases. Moreover, it has attempted to prohibit use of its funds for membership fees and dues, such as voluntary bar
association dues, or other contributions without prior approval. See Limitations on Transfer of Corporation Funds by
Recipients and on Certain Expenditures, 48 Fed. Reg. 28,485 (1983) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 1627) (proposed
June 22, 1983).
4. These significant financial eligibility restrictions would reduce the number of families eligible for Legal Services.
Many homeowners, particularly the elderly, would become ineligible. The proposed regulations also require that public
benefits be considered income, that Legal Services programs assume that all those in a household share income, and that
clients prove their eligibility. Other factors relevant to determining eligibility would be divided, in proposed § 1611.5 of
the Code of Federal Regulations, into factors weighing in favor of eligibility and against eligibility. The proposed rule
allows consideration of favorable factors to remain a local decision but mandates consideration of each unfavorable factor
to assure denial of assistance whenever possible. Also, financial eligibility of groups is substantially narrowed under
proposed § 1611.5(c). Only those groups composed primarily of eligible clients who are able to show a lack of means to
obtain private representation would qualify for Legal Services. A group whose purpose furthers the interests of eligible
clients, but that is not composed primarily of eligible clients, would be denied legal assistance even if it can show a lack of
means to obtain private counsel. Compare Eligibility, 48 Fed. Reg. 39,086 (1983) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 1611)
(proposed Aug. 29, 1983) vith 45 C.F.R. § 1611.5 (1982); see also N.Y. Times, Sept. 4, 1983, at 1, col. 5.
1984] LEGAL SERVICES AND GROUP REPRESENTATION 3
date, the political debaters often fail to understand the philosophical underpinnings of
the traditional justifications for poverty law programs.
Since its creation in 1974, 5 LSC has been mandated to provide high quality civil
legal services to low-income people and to be free from political restraints in pursuing
this task.6 This mandate has been weakened not only by severe funding cutbacks,
7
but also by restrictions on what LSC funds can be used for. Critics of LSC have
virtually prohibited the Corporation from representing the poor in abortion, school
desegregation, criminal, and military cases. 8 Furthermore, LSC attorneys have been
prohibited from representing illegal aliens, and there have been attempts to prevent
litigation of issues concerning homosexual persons and other unpopular groups. 9
5. LSC succeeded the highly politicized OEO Office of Legal Services. See E. JOHNSON, JUSTICE AND REFORM
71-146 (1974); George, Development of the Legal Services Corporation, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 681, 682-99 (1976);
Note, The Legal Services Corporation: Curtailing Political Interference, 81 YALE L.J. 231, 238-63 (1971).
In 1980, 323 Legal Services programs handled 1.5 million cases for America's 29 million poor. See 127 CoNcG. REC.
H2967 (daily ed. June 16, 1981) (statement of Rep. Railsback). In 1976 LSC handled about I million cases. By contrast,
OEO programs handled 290, 934 cases in 1967. For further information on OEO statistics, see Stumpf, Law and Poverty:
A Political Perspective, 1968 Wis. L. REV. 694, 698-701.
6. The Legal Services Corporation Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2996-29961(1976 & Supp. V 1981), declares that "there is a
need to provide high quality legal assistance" to those unable to afford it. Id. § 2996(2). The need to mandate in-
dependence was made clear by various actions taken within and without OEO to curtail the Legal Services program. For
instance, a report commissioned by OEO attempted to make LSC lawyers answerable to nonlawyer Community Action
staff and to regionalize the program. See, e.g., George, supra note 5, at 687-90, citing McKinsey & Co., Management
Study of OEO. Local boards refused to permit community education or group representation; bar associations in major
cities set per case upper dollar limits ($300 in one city), required racial segregation of staff, prevented economic
development, interfered after eligibility decisions were made, and made other demands curtailing services. See Note,
supra note 5, at 247-56. Vice-President Agnew spoke out against the Legal Services program in Camden, New Jersey,
arguing that the professional independence of lawyers conflicted with the need for public accountability and declaring that
the mayor of Camden represented the poor better than their attomeys could. See George, supra note 5, at 694. In 1973
President Nixon's handpicked OEO Director, Howard Phillips, began his job by limiting program refunding, firing the
Legal Services director, eliminating law reform from program goals, and preparing to excise backup centers, saying that
Legal Services lawyers would not spend public funds to oppose the President's policies. His activities were soon enjoined,
and his appointment declared illegal. See id. at 695. Some courts even tried to restrict legal aid programs by requiring
them to get permission to practice in the trial courts and limiting their right to represent certain clients. See Botein, The
Constitutionality of Restrictions on Poverty Laiv Firms:A New York Case Studv, 46 N.Y.U. L. REV. 748, 749-50 (1971).
7. The Corporation's budget was reduced in fiscal year 1981 from $321 million to $241 million for 1982 and 1983.
See 129 CONG. REC. S5160 (daily ed. Apr. 21, 1983) (statement of Sen. Kennedy); 127 CONG. REc. H2968 (daily ed.
June 16, 1981) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier); N.Y. Times, Sept. 4, 1983, at 1, col. 5. Kennedy noted that Legal
Services had lost 24% of its lawyers due to cutbacks from its 1980 appropriation. LSC began with a budget of $92 million
in 1975. Legal Services Corporation Act Amendments of 1977: Hearings on S. 1303 Before the Subcomm. on Employ-
ment, Poverty, and Migratory Labor of the Senate Comm. on Human Resources, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 41 (1977). From
1966 to 1971 the OEO Legal Services budget rose from $20 million to $53 million. Pearson, To Protect the Rights of the
Poor: The Legal Services Corporation Act of 1971, 19 U. KAN. L. REv. 641, 642 (1971).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 2996f(b) (Supp. V 1981) prohibits criminal representation, except with respect to misdemeanors;
collateral attacks on convictions; and proceedings to procure nontherapeutic abortions, to force people to perform
abortions, or to provide facilities for abortions in violation of their religious or moral convictions. It also prevents
representation in any proceeding concerning desegregation of elementary and secondary schools, or, except for improper
classification cases, violations of the Selective Service Act or military desertion. For a short history of these amendments,
see George, supra note 5, 696-98.
9. H.R. 3480, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) [hereinafter cited as H.R. 3480], the 1981 LSC reauthorization bill,
provided for prohibitions against legal assistance to "promote, defend or protect homosexuality" or to "adjudicate the
legalization of homosexuality," and cut off funding for promulgating proposed LSC regulations on homosexuality.
Abortion restrictions were further tightened to prevent all assistance except legal advice, unless the abortion was necessary
to save the life of the mother. H.R. 3480 prohibited representation of aliens, other than those lawfully admitted, spouses,
parents, or children of citizens, certain refugees, and those for whom deportation was withheld. The bill also included
restrictions on cases relating to education. See the floor debates, 127 CONG. REc. H3073-105 (daily ed. June 18, 1981)
and 127 CONG. REc. H2974 (daily ed. June 16, 1981) (statement of Rep. Wirth) (education cases). H.R. 3480 was passed
by the House, see 127 CONG. REc. H3127-28 (daily ed. June 18, 1981), but was never acted on by the Senate. However,
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Finally, legislation has curtailed the ability of LSC attorneys to lobby, to organize
client groups, to file class actions against government officials, and to receive attor-
neys' fees for certain kinds of cases.
10
Such restrictions are based on congressional concern over alleged violations of
statutory requirements by LSC grantees. 1 However, the most persistent of these and
other charges 12 have been refuted by government investigators. Objections made in
House and Senate floor debates, other than those involving alleged violations, have
many of the restrictions contained in the House bill were incorporated in a series of resolutions continuing appropriations
for LSC. See, e.g., Act of Dec. 21, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-377, 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (96 Stat.) 1830. For
a summary of Congressional actions on LSC reauthorization and appropriations, see 37 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 412-14
(1981); 38 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 246-49, 412-13 (1982). Similarly, the Family Protection Act, S. 1378, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1981), would have prohibited LSC funds from being used in abortion, gay and lesbian rights, school busing, and
divorce cases. 127 CONG. REc. S6324-638 (daily ed. June 17, 1981) (statement of Sen. Jepsen).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 2996f (Supp. V 1981). Specifically, § 2996f(a)(5) prohibits LSC lawyers from attempting to
influence passage or revocation of federal, state, and local laws and regulations, unless either the action is necessary for a
particular eligible client's case and the client is not solicited for the purpose of obtaining authorization to lobby, or the
government body requests information or testimony. LSC funds may also be used to lobby these entities if the measures
directly affect it or its grantees. Id. § 2996f(a)(5)(B)(ii). Nonetheless, members of Congress frequently claim this
lobbying is improper or illegal. See, e.g., 127 CONG. REC. H3015-16 (daily ed. June 17. 1981) (statement of Rep.
Collins). Legislation pending in Congress, S. 1133, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. (1983), would add further restrictions to class
action litigation. See 129 CONG. REC. S5158-60 (daily ed. Apr. 21, 1983) (statement of Sen. Eagleton).
11. In successive congressional deliberations on continuing appropriations for LSC, there have been furious floor
debates about these restrictions, particularly on lobbying and organizing. See, e.g., 127 CONG. REC. H3073-128 (daily
ed. June 18, 1981); 127 CONG. REC. H2966-96 (daily ed. June 16, 1981); 121 CONG. REC. 35,269 (1975) (statement of
Rep. Ashbrook); 120 CONG. REC. 24,014-60 (1974); 120 CONG. REC. 14,995-15,014 (1974); 120 CONG. REC. 1620-32,
1634-723 (1974); 119 CONG. REC. 41,458-64 (1973); 119 CONG. REC. 20,685-758,41,068-88,41,629-36,41,654-58
(1973). General Accounting Office (GAO) investigators and congressional hearings have failed to discover more than one
or two violations of controversial restrictions such as lobbying. See Oversight Hearings on Legal Services Corporation
Before the Subcomm. on Employment. Poverty, and Migratory Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human
Resources, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1980) (statement of Edward Densmore, GAO); GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
REVIEW OF LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION'S AcrIvITIES CONCERNING PROGRAM EVALUATION AND EXPANSION, REPORT
No. B-199777, 14-17 (Aug. 28, 1980); see also TIME, Oct. 3, 1983, at 83. While some members of Congress who were
lobbied expressed their concerns to the GAO, no evidence showed this activity to be outside the bounds of the statute. But
see Currin, Legal Services Corporation 3 (Sept. 25, 1980) (report prepared by assistant to Sen. Helms) (on file at Ohio
State University Law Library); Gest, supra note 1, at 66-67.
At most, these hearings have uncovered complaints from farmers that LSC attorneys representing farm workers were
interfering with their contractual relationships and complaints from defendants defeated by LSC lawyers in court.
See 49 Fed. Reg. 6943 (1984) (proposed rule concerning restrictions on lobbying and certain other activities).
12. The most renowned example is Governor Ronald Reagan's attack on the California Rural Legal Assistance
Program (CRLA) in 1970 and 1971. CRLA was OEO's prize program, noted for its law reform successes and administra-
tive improvements, such as implementation of a priority-setting system. Then Governor Reagan vetoed CRLA's funding
on December 26, 1970, several weeks later offering a report by California OEO Director Uhler as evidence in support of
his action. This report catalogued alleged disruptions in the California prison system and public schools, solicitation of
clients, stirring up litigation, and other CRLA actions, including organizing farm workers and taking criminal cases.
CALIFORNIA OFFICE OF ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY, A SUDY AND EVALUATION OF CALIFORNIA RURAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE,
INC. (197 1). Uhler refused to produce any witnesses to support his report at hearings on the report before a commission of
the national OEO, or to take part in the proceedings, preferring to conduct his "trial" by press with the support of Goveror
Reagan. After several days of hearings, the commission issued a 400-page report stating that various charges were
"completely unwarranted" and without "a shred of evidence," and that Uhler's report as a whole was "totally irresponsible
and without foundation." REPORT OF THE OFFICE OF ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION ON CALIFORNIA RURAL
LEGAL ASSISTANCE, INC. 55, 82, 84 (1971). For a detailed account, see Falk & Pollak, Political Ilterference with
Publicy Funded Lawyers: Tire CRLA Controversy and the Future of Legal Services, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 599 (1973). See
also George, supra note 5, at 683-87; Gest, supra note I, at 66; Pearson, supra note 7. at 646-47.
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concerned the substantive goals of LSC clients. 13 In addition, members of Congress
and others have objected to the use of federal funds to provide legal services for the
poor, 14 and even to any subsidization of legal services by local government.' 5 Such
concerns, as we will show at the end of this Article, are only remotely relevant to the
specific congressional restrictions which have been passed to limit LSC attorneys.
One recurring debate which does bear directly on how Legal Services' funds are
allocated is between law reform advocates and equal access proponents. The former
group views LSC's chief goal as provision of legal assistance to attack the causes and
effects of poverty, whereas the latter group believes that LSC should primarily
provide equal access to the courts for as many poor individuals as possible. Marshall
Breger, one of the most articulate new critics of LSC, has claimed that the fun-
damental right to counsel for the poor can be protected only through allocation and
litigation procedures which give equal weight to each poor person's complaint, not by
procedures which also weigh the group impact of a given poor person's case.' 6
Seizing on this rationale, new LSC officials have urged further restrictions on case
13. For years, critics have claimed that the private sector can provide adequate legal services for the poor without
public intervention. See, e.g., Hazard, Social Justice Through Civil Justice, 36 U. Cmt. L. REV. 699, 700 (1969); OMB
REPORT, supra note 1, at 1-3, 46; Gest, supra note 1, at 67; N.Y. Times, Dec. 24, 1982, at B4, col. 3 (quoting Edwin
Meese). The American Bar Association and others have refuted arguments that private lawyers can fully meet the need for
legal services for the poor. See, e.g., OMB REPORT, supra note 1, at 9-10; E. JOHNSON, supra note 5, at 55-64
(discussing a speech by then ABA President Lewis Powell and subsequent adoption by the ABA of a resolution endorsing
the OEO Legal Services Program); Pye, The Role of Legal Services in the Antipoverty Program, 31 LAW & CoNTE1trP.
Pons. 211, 214-18 (1966). As a report by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) admitted, unless the bar
requires pro bono service as a condition of licensure (OMB estimates that 30 hours per year per attorney would equal the
amount of hours LSC attorneys now provide in legal services to the poor) or assesses itself to pay for legal services, even
the current level of services cannot be provided. OMB REPORT, supra note 1, at 8-16. Donald Bogard, President of LSC,
acknowledges the possibility that mandatory private bar involvement may be sufficient. Gest, supra note 1, at 67. All the
hard evidence currently available suggests that without forced labor, assessment, or alternative programs paid from some
source, the serious legal needs of the poor in both urban and rural areas will remain unmet. See, e.g., Widiss, Legal
Assistance for the Rural Poor: An Iowa Study, 56 IOWA L. REV. 100, 114-24 (1970).
Other LSC opponents continue to argue that lawyers should not be suing the government that pays them. See, e.g.,
Pearson, supra note 7, at 644; see also floor debates, 127 CONG. REc. H3014-16 (daily ed. June 17, 1981) (especially
statement of Rep. Collins, at H3015-16); 120 CONo. REc. 1685-86 (1974) (statement of Sen. Long). As Representative
Rousselot described it, LSC would "conscript the dollars of taxpaying citizens and ... use those dollars to effect a
redistribution of wealth and political power in this country in favor of the legal services attorney and the militant pressure
groups which have already grown rich and powerful as a result of this program." 119 CONG. REc. 20,705 (1973).
A third position is that the poor are suffering at the hands of social activist lawyers. See OMB REPORT, supra note I,
at 16-21; 127 CONG. REc. H3123-24 (daily ed. June 18, 1981) (statement of Rep. Lagomarsino). Poor people's
perceptions seem to contradict this argument. In one study, those lawyers most ideologically in favor of social reform
were found most active in community groups and least likely to be perceived as part of the power structure oppressing
poor people. Finman, OEO Legal Services Programs and the Pursuit of Social Change: The Relationship Between
Program Ideology and Program Performance, 1971 Wis. L. REv. 1001, 1053-56, 1072-73. Legal Services lawyers have
even been criticized for opting for overly traditional solutions to client problems. See Bellow, Turning Solutions into
Problems: The LegalAid Experience, 34 NLADA BtcEcASE 106, 108-09 (1977); Hosticka, We Don't Care About What
Happened, We Only Care About What is Going to Happen: Lawyer-Client Negotiations of Reality, 26 Soc. PROBS. 599,
607-08 (1979).
14. See, e.g., 127 CoNO. REc. H3015 (daily ed. June 17, 1981) (statement of Rep. Collins).
15. See, e.g., 127 CONO. REc. S13,345-59, 13,360-68 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1981) (particularly statements of Sen.
Denton, at S33,353-54, and Sen. Thurmond, at S13,354, regarding deleting all funding); 127 CoNO. REC. H2936 (daily
ed. June 16, 1981) (statement of Rep. Hyde proposing funding through individual attorney income tax credit).
16. See Breger, Legal Aid for the Poor: A Conceptual Analysis, 60 N.C.L. REV. 282, 286-97 (1982).
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
selection procedures employed by LSC grantees as well as restrictions on the use of
class actions. 17 This once largely theoretical debate, then, has produced quite serious
statutory restrictions on the provision of legal services. We will therefore consider the
validity of these equal access objections to group impact considerations, but will also
weigh the impact of those objections on the legal ethics of poverty litigation. More-
over, we will demonstrate how such misplaced objections have resulted in recent
congressional placement of unsound procedural restrictions on Legal Services pro-
grams.
In this Article we will evaluate the objections of equal access advocates in order
to see if these objections justify currently proposed restrictions on LSC. As we will
indicate, we support the theory's initial assumption that the poor have a right to legal
services in civil cases. But we will then dispute three assumptions made by Breger
and other equal access defenders. First, we will contest Breger's contention that
access rights are different from and more important than welfare rights. Second, we
will dispute the conclusion that a concern for rights prohibits the consideration of
group impact in decisions about which clients obtain legal assistance. Rather, we
argue that equal access concerns and group impact considerations are compatible.
Third, we will counter the argument that prohibiting LSC lawyers from serving
group interests poses no ethical problems. We will demonstrate that a concern for the
ethical requirements of the Code of Professional Responsibility is consistent with use
of the class action device by LSC lawyers. Finally, we will discuss the most recent set
of procedural restrictions on Legal Services programs' use of the class action. Not
only are these restrictions, born of the conservative mood of 1980, unnecessary from
the perspectives of indigent clients, potential defendants, and the public; they also run
contrary to the dictates of the Code of Professional Responsibility as well as to the
tenets of proponents of both equal access and law reform models for delivering legal
services to the poor.
II. THE POLITICS OF POVERTY LAW
Defenders of both dominant models of poverty law agree that the poor have a
greater need for publicly financed lawyers than do the non-poor. Equal access pro-
ponents believe that the right to counsel is essential for procedural justice; and law
reform proponents believe that the right to counsel is essential in the fight to end
poverty in America. But neither group has been successful in convincing those who
control any of the three branches of government that such a right should be recog-
nized in civil as well as criminal cases. The Supreme Court has consistently refused
to extend the constitutional right to counsel to civil cases. Congress has traditionally
provided funds for only about ten to fifteen percent of the civil legal needs of the
17. See, e.g., Legal Services Corporation-1981: Oversight Hearings before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil
Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary. 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7, 17, 22,
33-34, 41 (1982) (testimony of Donald Bogard, LSC president; William F. Harvey and William E. Olson, LSC board
members); see 49 Fed. Reg. 1088 (1984) (proposed rule requiring equal access for all clients in case selection).
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poor. 8 Most recently, President Reagan has tried to use his executive powers to
dismantle LSC altogether. As we will discuss later, Congress has also passed un-
necessary procedural restrictions on the filing of class actions that cut deeply into the
ability of LSC lawyers to represent clients as the statute mandates. As a result of these
actions, the politics of poverty law are the politics of scarce legal resource allocation.
Because of the refusal of all branches of American government to fully support
and finance counsel for the poor, defenders of poverty law programs have split over
allocation procedures for these scarce resources. Defenders of the law reform model
favor case selection strategies within poverty law programs that are directed toward
having a maximum impact (hereafter called "group impact") on eradicating
poverty. 19 This first model has been criticized for placing too little emphasis on the
specific and often unique problems of individual poor clients.2 0 By contrast, the
proponents of the equal access model generally favor case selection strategies that are
directed toward the legal problems of each individual poor client who seeks help from
the Legal Services program. 2 1 This second model has been criticized for failing to
consider the problems of the poor as a group, problems which often cannot be
understood from the individual poor person's perspective alone. 22 In the more de-
tailed discussion which follows we will contend that the models are not as distinct as
their adherents claim, and that neither model is incompatible with case selection
procedures or litigation strategies designed to maximize group impact.
A. The Right to Counsel for the Poor
Defenders of poverty law programs have argued that the right to counsel for each
poor person is a fundamental right. They have not had much luck convincing the
members of the three branches of government to accept such a strong claim. As
background, we will sketch how the Supreme Court has receded from requiring
appointed counsel in civil cases, while affirming the importance of counsel, to illus-
trate why allocation of Legal Services resources is a crucial issue to the poor. In
refusing to require counsel in civil cases, the Court has made the liberty interest
18. In 1976 Roger Cramton noted that only 1.2 million of the 29 million poor in the United States had real access to a
Legal Services program, and only about 15% of the total need was being met. Cramton, Promise and Reality in Legal
Services, 61 CORNELL L. REv. 670, 672-73 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Cramton, Promise and Reality]. In 1981 he
estimated that one-eighth of the legal needs of the eligible poor was being met with LSC's $321 million. Cramton, Crisis
in Legal Services for the Poor, 26 ViLL. L. REv. 521, 530 (1981). With the budget reduction to $241 million and
inflation, probably less than 10% of those needs are being met at the present time. Excluding inflation, full funding for
Legal Services would cost only about $2.6 billion, based on these figures, or less than one-sixth of the federal Medicaid
budget for 1981.
19. E. JOHNSON, supra note 5, at 248-84; see Breger, Disqualification for Conflicts of Interest and the Legal Aid
Attorney, 62 B.U.L. Rev. 1115, 1137-38 (1982); George, supra note 5, at 710-11.
20. See E. JOHNSON, supra note 5, at 10-14; Breger, supra note 16, at 342.
21. Breger, supra note 19, at 1138.
22. See, e.g., Wexler, Practicing Law for Poor People, 79 YALE L.J. 1049, 1052-54 (1970). Moreover, some of
the equal access rhetoric is predicated on the assumption that lawyers work within existing law rather than to change law.
See, e.g., 127 CONo. REc. H3031-32 (daily ed. June 17, 1981) (colloquy between Reps. Shamansky and Sawyer). This
understanding may treat law as an independent entity not subject to criticism, and lawyers may thus perpetuate coercion of
some individuals by others. See McBride, An Overview of Future Possibilities: Law Unlimited?, in NoMos XV: THE
Ltmrrs OF LAw 28, 31-37 (1974).
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which is at jeopardy in criminal prosecutions the Court's doctrinal focal point. In
cases that do not threaten loss of liberty, such as civil matters, the Court merely uses a
due process tests balancing state and individual interests to determine whether coun-
sel is necessary.
After several years of requiring counsel selectively based on the circumstances
of individual cases,23 the Court in Gideon v. Wainwright24 extended the right to
appointed counsel to indigent criminal defendants in all cases involving imprison-
ment. For some time, it appeared that the Court's decisions on right to counsel would
rest on equal protection and due process grounds which would be equally applicable
to civil cases in which appointed counsel was sought. In a series of cases attempting
to equalize access to the courts by challenging financial barriers to access by in-
digents, the Court relied on the equal protection and due process clauses to invalidate
monetary preconditions to appeals. For instance, in Douglas v. California,25 the
Court held that the state was required to provide an indigent defendant with free
counsel for purposes of appellate review, 26 and in Griffin v. Illinois,27 a free appellate
transcript was required. 28 Later, filing fees and other costs barring access for manda-
tory appeals were eliminated. 29 Griffin's wisdom that "[tihere can be no equal justice
where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has," 30 seemed
to presage later equal protection scrutiny which was levelled at wealth
classifications. 3 ' Moreover, access to the courts, emphasized by Griffin, appeared to
be only one in an expanding array of fundamental rights protected strictly by the
courts.3 2 When such wealth classifications were conjoined with fundamental in-
23. Camley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 508-13 (1962) (technicality of procedural rights and possible defenses,
illiteracy, absence of cross-examination of state's potentially biased witnesses); Hudson v. North Carolina, 363 U.S. 697,
703 (1960) (technicality of possible defenses); Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155, 159-60 (1957) (youth, lack of
education, severity of penalty, technicality of possible defenses); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932) (ignorance
of law, illiteracy, youth, public hostility, imprisonment and close surveillance by military, difficulty of communication
with friends and family, severity of penalty). But see Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,462-63,468 (1938) (unconditional
right to counsel).
24. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
25. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
26. Id. at 355-57.
27. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
28. Id. at 18-20.
29. Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40 (1967) (right to free transcript of preliminary hearings); Long v. District
Court, 385 U.S. 192 (1966) (right to counsel and free transcript for habeas corpus appeal); Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477
(1963) (right to free appellate transcript despite state requirement that public defender request one); Smith v. Bennett, 365
U.S. 708 (1961) (right to waiver of filing fee for application for writ of habeas corpus). States are not required to provide
an appellate review process, see Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956), but if they elect to do so they may not bar
indigents because of their poverty. But cf. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974) (free counsel not required when appeal is
discretionary with state supreme court).
30. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956).
31. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 383-86 (Douglas, J., concurring), 386-89 (Brennan, J., concurring
in part) (1971).
?2. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-54 (1973) (right to privacy in procreative matters); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-31 (1969) (right to travel); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964) (right to
vote).
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terests, such as the right to vote, state requirements which prohibited or infringed on
exercises of such rights were struck down.
3 3
Very early after Griffin, however, the Court began to distinguish its rationale for
requiring appointed counsel from the rationale on which it invalidated other barriers
to court access. In both Gideon and Argersinger v. Hamlin,34 which extended the
right to appointed counsel to misdemeanants facing significant incarceration, the
Court relied on the sixth amendment's guarantee of counsel rather than the general
provisions of the fourteenth amendment.3 5 In such cases, the Court stressed one
factor also applicable to civil settings: the need for equal representation of the parties
in court, demonstrated by the public's practice of hiring lawyers as prosecutors.
However, in distinguishing criminal from civil cases, the Court emphasized the
particular burden on a defendant when the state is both prosecutor and judge.36
Perhaps the most hopeful sign for the civil defendant or plaintiff facing odds
similar to those faced by criminal defendants was Boddie v. Connecticut,37 in which
the Court appeared ready to erase the distinction between civil and criminal cases,
and establish a right to access to the courts which would include the counsel neces-
sary for all indigent litigants to have a meaningful day in court. In Boddie, indigent
persons challenged a civil filing fee required before a divorce could be pursued. 38 The
Court, in invalidating the fee under the due process clause, stressed the need for civil
litigants to be able to procure divorces in the state's monopolistic adjudicatory
system. 39 However, the special emphasis which the Boddie Court placed on the fact
that the case concerned divorce, which could be obtained exclusively through the
33. See, e.g., Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 254-62, 269 (1974) (wealth classification
infringes right to travel); McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 807 (1969) (wealth classification
infringes right to vote); see also Brickman, OfArterial Passageways Through the Legal Process: The Right of Universal
Access to Courts and Lawryering Services, 48 N.Y.U. L. REv. 595, 600-07 (1973) (discussing fundamental rights cases
and arguing that access to the courts is a fundamental right).
However, the trend toward coupling fundamental interests and potential wealth classifications to justify heightened
scrutiny was halted in San Antonio Indep. School Dist. No. 1 v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). While the Court's
reluctance to level strict scrutiny at classifications involving wealth or necessities of life had become apparent in James v.
Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971) (challenge to requirement of referendum before development of low-income housing), and
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (rejecting challenge to AFDC grant computations), the Court, by clearly
holding in Rodriguez that wealth is not a suspect classification and that education is not a fundamental interest, 411 U.S.
1, 18-39 (1973), slowed the further evolution of fundamental rights decisions; see G. GuNTiER, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON CONSTrITITIONAL LAv 961-68 (10th ed. 1980). This rationale was extended to claims that court filing fees dis-
criminated against the poor in Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 660 (1973).
34. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
35. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-45 (1963); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 27-31 (1972).
Although the sixth amendment is made applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment, the Argersinger Court
did not rest its decision on the fundamental fairness arguments made in other due process cases. The Court has also refused
to extend the Argersinger rationale to cases in which incarceration is not a possibility. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367,
369 (1979).
36. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963). Professor Lester Brickman agrees that the prosecutorial
role, the threat of loss of life, and the indigent's lack of choice underscore the need for counsel, but argues that the courts
are the exclusive forum for ultimate resolution of all disputes. See Brickman. supra note 33, at 608.
37. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
38. Id. at 372-73.
39. Id. at 375-77.
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courts and touched on the fundamental right of marriage, was subsequently used to
block other attempts to seek access for indigents unable to pay fees.
n0
Any doubt about the fact that the Court was creating separate due process
requirements for criminal and civil litigants was dispelled recently in Lassiter v.
Department of Social Services.4 1 Before Lassiter, Boddie (and other case law which
extended the right of access to the courts to inmates in a variety of situations)42 could
arguably be extended to civil cases where the interest involved was compelling and
the inequality of the parties clear. In Lassiter, however, the Court rejected an abso-
lute rule requiring appointed counsel in civil cases under the due process clause in
favor of a balancing test which the Court had developed in the administrative due
process cases. 43 Thus, the Court ruled that appointment of counsel might be required
when the balance of the indigent person's interest, the state's interest, and the risk of
error pointed to such appointment. Significantly, however, the Court skewed that
balance from the start by stating emphatically that courts should begin with the
presumption that counsel need not be appointed unless the indigent person's freedom
was at stake. 44 That presumption appears to have been the deciding factor in Lassiter,
which involved termination of parental rights. Despite the Court's candid recognition
that the parent's interest was fundamental, at least as strong as the state interest, and
that there was significant risk of error in the proceeding, Lassiter was not granted the
40. See id. at 374. The Court later retreated from its Boddie analysis in United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973),
upholding a filing fee as a condition to discharge of debts through voluntary bankruptcy, and Ortwein v. Schwab, 410
U.S. 656 (1973), denying waiver of a filing fee for an appeal from a reduction of welfare benefits. The Court dis-
tinguished these cases from Boddie because the interests sought to be defended were not as fundamental as divorce, and
litigation was not the only means to protect the interests of the indigents. The Court's analysis, particularly in Ortwein, is
troubling because it involved the denial of basic human needs in a setting in which only litigation could force the welfare
agency to reverse its decision. The Court justified its holding on the theory that the right tojudicial appeal is discretionary
with the state. It appears that, as in its decisions involving prisoners' access to counsel, e.g., Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S.
817, 827-28 (1977), the Court was attempting to distinguish between the need for access at the trial and appellate levels,
and considered the latter less crucial. Neither of these analyses, however, appears consistent with Douglas. which admits
the importance of counsel at the appellate stage. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 355 (1963).
For cases denying the right to appointed counsel in civil cases, see Breger, supra note 16, at 290 n.42 (1982).
41. 452 U.S. 18 (1981). Lassiter's parental rights were terminated because she had not had contact with her
neglected child for over two years. In part, that lack of contact resulted from her serving a prison sentence for most of the
period during which the alleged non-contact occurred. Thus, Lassiter was not only unrepresented by counsel, but was
unable to prepare for her defense because of her incarceration. Id. at 20-21.
42. See, e.g., Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977). Bounds required inmate access to the courts to be "adequate,
effective, and meaningful." Id. at 822. The state had to provide either an adequate law library, as the district court had
ordered, or essentially equal opportunities for prisoners to be assisted in filing their petitions, such as adequate assistance
from persons trained in law. While the Court emphasized the importance of habeas corpus petitions and civil rights
actions, its holding on access to the courts was not specifically limited to prisoners. See also Wolff v. McDonnell, 418
U.S. 539 (1974) (right to lay assistance in prison disciplinary hearings); but see Payne v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 3d 903,
914-19, 553 P.2d 565, 570-73, 132 Cal. Rptr. 405, 410-13 (1976) (right to access to courts for imprisoned civil
defendant).
43. 452 U.S. 18, 27-33 (1981). The Court relied on its analysis in Mathews v. Eldridge, in which it held that Social
Security disability recipients need not be given a hearing prior to termination of their benefits. 424 U.S. 319, 334-35
(1976).
44. 452 U.S. 18, 26-27 (198 1). As Justice Stevens pointed out in his dissent, there is no due process clause basis for
elevating the physical liberty interest over others protected by the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 59-60 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); see also id. at 40-42 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Brickman, supra note 33, at 623, citing Argersinger v.
Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 48 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring). Moreover, the Court has required appointed counsel even when
only chinges in confinement were contemplated rather than direct infringement of liberty. See, e.g., Vitek v. Jones, 445
U.S. 480, 492-94 (1980) (transfer of prisoner from prison to mental hospital infringed protected liberty interest).
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right to counsel.45 By its reliance on case-by-case determinations, Lassiter left open
the question of what interests should be protected in civil cases, and how the balance
should be struck by trial courts. However, given the Court's rejection of requests for
counsel in other cases,46 the decision bodes ill for further extension of the right to
counsel in civil cases.
B. Poor People and the Need for Counsel
Despite the Court's rulings, individual Justices have suggested the need for
stricter standards for determining when counsel was required than the balancing test
used by the Court in Lassiter. For instance, Justice Stevens, dissenting in Lassiter,
pointed out that the provision of counsel in such cases should not be determined by
balancing financial cost against societal benefits, but on the basis of "fundamental
fairness.,,47 Similarly, Justice Brennan in Boddie argued that wealth-related barriers
to access to the courts must swiftly be removed under the due process and equal
protection clauses .48 Perhaps one of the most significant declarations of the universal
applicability of the right to access to the courts was made by Justice Black, who had
dissented in Boddie:
In my view, the decision in Boddie vs. Connecticut can safely rest on only one crucial
foundation-that the civil courts of the United States and each of the States belong to the
people of this country apd that no person can be denied access to those courts either for a
trial or an appeal, because he cannot pay a fee, finance a bond, risk a penalty, or afford to
45. 452 U.S. 18, 28-30, 33 (1981). As the dissent pointed out strongly, the Court recognized the "commanding"
interests of parents in caring for their children and the significant risk of error due to the lack of education of most parents
faced with termination, the stress of the situation, and the liberal use of expert testimony by the state. Id. at 35 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting). The Court seemed to draw the strange conclusion that the balance of these factors, as well as the state's
interest in accurate determination, against the state's interest in efficiency and economy, was insufficient to require
counsel because the evidence in the record showed that counsel would not have helped Lassiter. Since the record was
made by an incarcerated defendant without the help of appointed counsel, it is not surprising that the evidence was
preponderately in favor of the welfare department.
46. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 583 (1975) (right to any counsel denied in school disciplinary
proceedings); Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 614-16 (1974) (no right to counsel for habeas corpus action); Gagnon v.
Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778,787-90 (1973) (case-by-case rule adopted fordenial of counsel to probationers); see also Branch
v. Cole, 686 F.2d 264, 266 (5th Cir. 1982) (no right to counsel in civil rights cases); Caruth v. Pinkney, 683 F.2d 1044,
1048-49 (7th Cir. 1982); cf. Rhoades v. Penfold, 694 F.2d 1043, 1049-50 (5th Cir. 1983) (Lassiter requires only
individual determinations of whether counsel is needed in termination of parental rights cases).
Conceivably, the Court's decisions, except for Kras and Ortwein, can be explained by the fact that the Court is much
less willing to acknowledge the right to counsel than the right to elimination of other financial access barriers, perhaps
because counsel is much more costly and the results of supplying counsel more speculative. For instance, in the same term
it decided Lassiter, the Court held in Little v. Streater, that an indigent paternity defendant's inability to pay could not
justify denial of a blood grouping test to prove his innocence. Again, the Court used the Mathewvs balancing test. 452 U.S.
1, 13-16 (1981). It would seem odd if the Court believed that the putative father's interest in avoiding support payments
was more compelling than Lassiter's interest in keeping her children. Moreover, the risks of error in both cases appear to
be similar, given the educational levels of the defendants and the possibility of using expert evidence. Apparently, the
state's more significant financial interest in providing counsel is the only distinction that can justify the divergence
between Lassiter and Little. See Lassiter v. Department of Social Service, 452 U.S. 18, 58 (1981) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting), in which Justice Blackmun discusses the discrepancy between Little and Lassiter. The Court's decisions under
the first amendment, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963), have led to some speculation that the first amendment
confers a right to group legal services. See Brickman, supra note 33, at 628-37.
47. 452 U.S. 18, 59-60 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
48. 401 U.S. 371, 388-89 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring in part).
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hire an attorney. . . . I believe there can be no doubt that this country can afford to
provide court costs and lawyers to Americans who are now barred by their poverty from
resort to the law for resolution of their disputes. 4
9
Thus, although the Court has failed to require counsel except in a small class of civil
cases, several members of the Court have spoken strongly on the general need for the
poor to have lawyers in adjudicating disputes.
The poor have needs entitling them to special protection in the legal process
First, the kind of legal problems common to the poor entail interests that are compar-
able to those of criminal litigants. In criminal litigation, the defendant risks loss of
liberty, loss of control over his or her means of support, loss of spouse and children
and, in some instances, loss of life itself. Similarly, the unsuccessful poor civil
litigant risks loss of economic liberty, loss of means of support, loss of spouse and
children, and even loss of those basic necessities which support life itself. For
example, despite the holding in Lassiter, a civil suit in which a poor person risks
being declared an unfit parent and being deprived of his or her children would seem to
be just as serious as the loss of liberty risked by a defendant in a criminal proceeding.
Second, the poor do not arrive before judicial tribunals on an equal footing with
the non-poor adversaries they sometimes face. This is especially true with regard to
their obtaining competent and zealous legal representation. Since courtroom pro-
ceedings are supposed to be fair and unbiased to all parties, justice seems to dictate
that the poor be provided with the means necessary to equalize their status in the
courtroom.
As with the courts, the current administration has also failed to recognize the
right and need of the poor for legal counsel in civil cases. Indeed, President Reagan
first sought to eliminate LSC and then to diminish greatly its budget. Historically,
Congress has also failed in this respect by consistently refusing to authorize sufficient
funding to provide free attorneys to all poor persons who may need them, and the
private sector has been unable to make up the difference. Since the previous level of
funding was reduced even further by recent presidential and congressional de-
cisions,50 LSC's ability to provide procedural justice for the poor has been greatly
hampered.
Some of Legal Services' chief critics such as Marshall Breger claim that the
group orientation of many Legal Services programs is a violation of the rights of
those poor persons who are thereby denied service. 51 To understand the impetus for
such charges we must recognize that legal services for the poor are a scarce commod-
ity. This scarcity is artificially generated since the government could easily decide to
49. Meltzer v. C. Buck LeCraw & Co., 402 U.S. 954, 955-56 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting from a denial of
certiorari). Also among the cases denied certiorari was a neglect proceeding similar to Lassiter brought against a welfare
mother in which counsel was denied. Robinson v. Kaufman, 8 Cal. App. 3d 783, 87 Cal. Rptr. 678 (1970), cert. denied,
402 U.S. 964 (1971).
50. See supra notes I and 7.
51. Breger, supra note 16, at 295, 344-52.
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allocate sufficient funds to meet the entire estimated need. 52 Presidential and con-
gressional unwillingness to provide adequate funding requires Legal Services boards
and directors to make hard choices about which poor person's complaints will receive
legal attention and which will not (the problem of scarce legal resource allocation).
The lack of funding to ensure counsel to all of the poor, since sufficient funds are
available to meet fully the legal need, is a serious indictment of a society that claims
to take this entitlement seriously, not a basis for restricting group-oriented approaches
to poverty law. What seems strangest to us is that the current critics of resource
allocation in Legal Services programs generally take funding shortfalls as a given.
53
Many of the people who criticize legal services for the way in which hard choices are
made in allocating these artificially scarce resources are also the same people who do
not actively support increased funding for legal services so that the poor clients would
not have to be turned away.
In defense of the current critics, Marshall Breger contends that even with more
funding, hard choices would still have to be made since the demand for legal ser-
vices, like that for health services, increases with increases in the supply.5 4 Admit-
tedly, as legal services attorneys diligently represent clients, they find the same
people turning up again and again after the first successful legal services experience.
Yet, there is no good reason to think that the demand for legal services will expand
indefinitely with every increase in supply. Current increases in demand reflect the
fact that the poor are often uninformed about the law, but become better informed
after the first encounter with a Legal Services lawyer. As the poor become more
aware of their legal rights, they will place more demands on Legal Services. Such
demands are reasonable given the needs these people face. We will not detail here
other reasons why some who wish to restrict LSC resource allocation procedures do
not put their energies into meeting the demands for legal services. 55 But, for the time
being, we will discuss the division in the legal services community caused by in-
adequate funding, and show that currently employed group-based selection pro-
cedures for allocating scarce legal resources do not constitute a denial of the rights of
the poor persons involved.
52. Congressional unwillingness to admit that the scarcity is artificially generated may spring from the public's
unwillingness to admit that it sets a price on justice. At some point, the cost of equal access must be considered too high
because it requires sacrifice of other desired goods. However, the price the public is willing to pay for justice is obscured
because of the damage done to this society's values if the price of justice is set too high. Only when attention is focused in
a sustained way on particular situations in which lack of counsel results in injustice does public pressure seek correction of
the problem. See generally G. CALAn RtES & P. Boanrrr, TRAoIC CHOICES 17-28, 134-43 (1978).
53. See, e.g., Breger, supra note 16, at 294-96, arguing that society's decision not to provide legal services to all
does not violate the right of poor people to be treated as equals with resepct to the need for legal assistance.
54. Id. at 285 nn. 14 & 17; see also Krislov, The OEO Lawyers Fail to Constitutionalize a Right to Welfare: A Study
in the Uses and Limits of the Judicial Process, 58 MItNN. L. REv. 211, 218 (1973).
55. Those who oppose the court victories won by LSC clients in suits against the government in the 1970's may see
the 1983 restrictions as a means to thwart the enforcement of those orders. See Denvir, Towards a Political Theory of
Public Interest Litigation, 54 N.C.L. Ray. 1133, 1143-58 (1976). Members of Congress have also seen case restrictions
on Legal Services programs as a way of preventing judicial legislation.
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C. Law Reform and Equal Access Rights: A False Dichotomy
In the last twenty years, two distinct models for providing legal services for the
poor have emerged: the law reform model and the equal access model. The first
model views legal services as one of many tools to be used to combat the institutional
problems of poverty, so that preference or interest satisfaction can be maximized
within society. 56 Proponents of the second model argue that poverty law programs are
a means for placing individual poor clients on an equal legal footing with the non-
poor, so that justice, which depends on this formal equality, can be advanced,
resulting in the optimal protection of the legal rights of all citizens.5 7 The split
between these two groups has been exacerbated by the increasing scarcity of funds for
poverty law programs. Yet, as we will argue, the reasoning used to justify even the
equal access model often supports group-impact case selection.
The law reform model takes as its guiding premise the belief that existing law
reinforces and even intensifies the plight of the poor. When the Office of Economic
Opportunity (OEO) first proposed a legal services program in the latter part of the
1960's, the founders contended that the war on poverty needed a publicly financed
cadre of lawyers who would seek extensive changes in existing legal structures and
relationships.58 The attack on these institutions and relationships was not to be
confined to individual courtroom legal action, but was to include group litigation
(especially class action suits) as well as social organizing, lobbying, and legal educa-
tion of poor persons who might be potential clients. 5
9
Since law reform proponents were often explicitly utilitarian in their political
philosophies, they did not attempt to narrow the focus of poverty law strategies,
56. The law reform model draws on the utilitarian philosophical tradition. For the clearest statement of this view, see
J. S. MILL, UTILITARIANISM ch. 2, especially pp. 6-14 (G. Sher ed. 1979). Law reform theorists believe that existing law
reinforces privations caused by poverty and that lawyering involves changing legal structures and relationships. See, e.g.,
E. JOHNSON, supra note 5, at 26, 34-35, 198-224. For other discussions of the differences between the equal access and
law reform models, see Finman, supra note 13, at 1002-04; Hannon, National Policy Versus Local Control: The Legal
Services Dilemma, 5 CAL. W.L. REv. 223, 223-29 (1969); Hazard, supra note 13, at 702--04; Pearson, supra note 7, at
643-45; Stumpf, supra note 5, at 703-04. Even the ABA has cited with approval impact litigation and other services, such
as lobbying, designed to establish new rights and entitlements. See ABA Section of Individual Rights and Responsibili-
ties, and Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants, Joint Informational Report, The Corporation for
Legal Services: A Study 13-15 (1971).
57. This model is heavily influenced by the philosophical "rights of man" tradition and recent work in liberal and
libertarian entitlement theory. See R. DWORKIN, TA ING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY ch. VI (1977); E. JOHNSON, supra note 5, at
10-14; R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA pt. 11 (1974); J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE ch. 1 (1971); Breger,
supra note 16, at 287-88; Cramton, Promise and Reality, supra note 18, at 674-78. Both the equal access and law reform
models recognize the importance of legal services for the public perception that the "law does strive for fairness and can be
an instrument for the change of our social order," thereby reducing citizen hostility. Pearson, supra note 7, at 643. For an
intermediate view, see Hazard, supra note 13, at 700-02.
58. While there was some dispute about whether social work professionals, lawyers, or clients should control these
efforts, E. JOHNSON, supra note 5, at 34-35, Jean and Edgar Cahn, who were at the center of the movement, came out
strongly in favor of client domination. See Cahn & Cahn, The War on Poverty: A Civilian Perspective, 73 YALE L.J.
1317, 1332-33, 1338-40 (1964). Thus, it is inaccurate to portray law reform proponents as opposing implementation of
client desires because they prefer to further social goals. The Calms believed that control by clients was necessary to
promote meaningful dissent inside the monolithic, self-perpetuating bureaucracies in charge of winning the war on
poverty.
59. Ironically, the Cahns stressed case orientation and partisanship on behalf of clients, but their perceptions of what
a case was went far beyond judicial parameters to include both presenting any grievance of the poor to those capable of
affecting it and organizing the poor where appropriate. See Cahn & Cahn, supra note 58, at 1344-46.
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except so as to guarantee that poverty was combatted in the most vigorous way
possible. However, most of these adherents assumed that group impact litigation and
extra-judicial law reform strategies would lead to fairer treatment of the poor at law
by equalizing the influence and power of poor clients and the non-poor. 60 Perhaps the
chief difference between this model and the equal access model is that law reform
proponents first seek collective solutions to the problems of the unequal legal stand-
ing of the poor, while equal access proponents start with individual solutions. Law
reform proponents try to achieve changes that will improve the legal standing of the
poor by employing all possible avenues open to lawyers, whereas equal access
proponents have stressed only those changes that can be accomplished through in-
dividual litigation strategies. 6'
A law reform orientation might lead a lawyer to assist a client wanting changes
in nursing home conditions, by helping the client organize a group of similarly
minded nursing home residents, by obtaining media coverage for them to air their
grievances and demands, by aiding the group in drafting petitions and testimony
before legislative committees, and most importantly for our study, by initiating a
class action law suit against the owners of the nursing home. In this way, the initial
unequal power relationship that existed between the poor person and the nursing
home owners might be overcome with the additional possibility of far-reaching
changes for nursing home residents other than the individual who came to the Legal
Services office. By contrast, the equal access model would normally favor only the
individual negotiations or suit brought in behalf of this one poor resident against the
nursing home owners, a suit which would be vigorously pursued, but which would
not be supplemented by any non-court representation and would probably not seek
classwide relief.
Equal access proponents agree that poor people do not normally confront the
non-poor on equal footing in the legal process. 62 However, they believe that if all
poor clients had competent and zealous legal counsel, the judicial proceedings would
produce results that were much fairer. Courts are presumed to be relatively in-
dependent of other political, social or economic influences. Additionally, the factual
record at trial is thought to be sufficiently closed to these legally extraneous matters
so that an impartial decisionmaker can regard the two parties fairly. But such fair
decisionmaking requires that each party have an articulate defender, marshalling
relevant facts to support his or her client's position, as well as challenging and
exposing weaknesses in the opponent's case. 63 According to these proponents, if
such defenders' skills are roughly equal, a fair verdict can then be rendered regardless
of who the parties are. Since each side is represented by savvy, articulate, and
60. See, e.g., Hannon, supra note 56, at 226-31; see also Hazard, supra note 13, at 699-704.
61. See Breger, supra note 19, at 1137-38; Hazard, supra note 13, at 708. Equal access proponents who came from
the legal aid experience often stressed accommodation over litigation to solve individual problems.
62. See, e.g., Breger's statement that those without lawyers in America's system are disadvantaged, supra note 16,
at 291; see also Cramton, Promise and Reality, supra note 18, 674-78.
63. Hazard, supra note 13, at 703; see also Brickman, supra note 33, at 617.
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respectable lawyers (who in these respects resemble the judge), outside bias will not
be likely to enter into the judge's decisionmaking.
The equal access proponents thus put exclusive emphasis on providing high
quality legal counsel for those who seek and yet who cannot afford such counsel.
These proponents argue forcefully that the law reform proponents contribute to the
plight of individual poor persons by disregarding the particular problems and desires
of those who seek their help, instead lumping the poor together into one homogenous
group for class representation. 64 According to equal access proponents, only by
viewing the poor as discrete individuals can the poverty lawyer represent the poor in
the same way his or her counterparts represent the non-poor clients and thus ensure
that the legal rights of the poor are as secure as those of all other citizens.
The proponents of the two models claim that their differences come out most
clearly in the type of case selection procedures sanctioned by their respective views.
Put simply, law reform proponents sanction case selection procedures which would
consistently choose the suit or legal action which has the greatest impact on the
greatest number of poor persons' interests; whereas equal access proponents sanction
case selection procedures which give equal weight to the unique interests of in-
dividual poor persons who seek legal help. Assuming that funds for Legal Services
programs for the poor are scarce, how will these models help lawyers decide which
poor persons' cases to handle? It appears that group-oriented, utilitarian schemes are
favored by law reform models, and random schemes, which put equal weight on each
poor person's case, are favored by equal access models.
Yet not all law reformers or equal access proponents favor these schemes rig-
idly. Most equal access proponents prefer selection procedures which are not totally
random, some allowing emergency cases to override all others. 65 But as with any
other exceptions, what counts as an emergency is often hard to determine without
weighing the interests in the so-called emergency case against those who would have
to be turned away, and thus the equal weight principle is not consistently adhered
to. 6 6 A second preference is for non-random procedures which put case selection into
the hands of client boards. 67 But such procedures also fail to give equal weight to
64. See, e.g., Agnew, What's Wrong with the Legal Services Program, 58 A.B.A. J. 930, 931-32 (1972); Breger,
supra note 16, at 349-51.
65. Breger, supra note 16, at 354-58. Breger would also give preference, at least in allocating government funding,
to indigents who might be denied counsel because their opponents were receiving LSC assistance. Legal Services cannot
represent indigents who are opposing parties because of the apparent conflict of interest (although Breger suggests
otherwise). Yet, in Breger's view, if only one indigent party has LSC counsel, he or she has an unfair advantage over the
other. Apparently, Breger does not find the imbalance created when a non-indigent person with counsel faces an
unrepresented indigent sufficiently compelling to require appointed counsel for the indigent in all cases. See Breger, supra
note 19, at 1139-41 and accompanying notes.
66. See Breger, supra note 16, at 354-55. As any Legal Services lawyer can relate, what constitutes an emergency is
often in the eye of the client. However, under the equal access model, it is difficult to explain why Legal Services lawyers
may rely on their own values and priorities to identify an objective emergency, disregarding clients' demands for
immediate service, but not to decide which cases are more socially useful. For instance, it would be difficult to choose the
most urgent case among an imminent child custody hearing, an eviction (Breger's emergency case), or a divorce when one
spouse is being beaten or not receiving support. It would be a rare Legal Services office in which the majority of cases
were not emergencies, if that term is used to define cases in which "a great deal is at stake," or in which a client's basic
needs or fundamental rights are implicated.
67. Id. at 332-34. Certainly, LSC has considered the utility of client input since it is required to include clients on
local boards, see, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 2996c(a), 2996f(c) (Supp. V 1981), and to consider client needs in setting priorities.
Id. § 2996f(a)-(c) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
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each poor client's desires and needs, for such boards will consistently look to many of
their own subjective factors. The ideal of giving equal weight to each poor person's
problem is at least partially abandoned by these more realistic legal services alloca-
tion considerations. By contrast, law reform proponents often stress that programs
should consider exceptions to the rule of greatest group impact, such as emergencies,
hardship cases, or problems of serious concern to the clients. 68 Like equal access
proponents, their proposed allocation schemes are by no means "pure."
D. Group Impact and the Class Action
Law reform proponents have argued that emphasis on the group impact of cases,
that is, the aggregate effect of a given case on the poor as a group, is the most
effective way to combat the causes of poverty which invidiously affect individual
poor persons. One of the central assumptions of their position is that the poor do
indeed share common interests as a class which are often best served by group-
oriented case selection and litigation strategies. However, such "group impact" strat-
egies often redound to the benefit of individuals, even if their cases are considered in
isolation. As we will show in the next section, group impact approaches to poverty
law do not necessarily work to the disadvantage of the individual poor persons who
seek legal assistance for their problems. Supporters of equal access models are
generally not willing to admit that group-oriented approaches to poverty law secure
the rights of poor individuals. Yet, the fact is that group representation devices such
as the class action are often the most effective way of representing an individual poor
person. First, consider the poor client who has been denied benefits by a welfare
official. The attorney who files (or threatens to file) suit on behalf of this person alone
generally will not be taken as seriously as the lawyer who attempts to file a class
action law suit on the same matter. Moreover, unlike the class suit, 69 the individual
suit will often be rendered moot if the welfare official grants the client the minimal
benefit to which he or she was entitled if the suit were successful. But, as often
happens, a month or two later the same official may vindictively deny the benefits
again, perhaps in retaliation for the lawsuit. The individual lawsuit, which may
restore some of the economic benefits lost by the poor person, cannot remedy past
and future harassment or restore the political balance of power between the institution
and the individual. By contrast, the class suit can secure relief for the client that is not
only longer-lasting but also broader-based. Additionally, the publicity accompanying
the class suit places more of a burden on the welfare official to explain his or her
conduct to supervisors and members of the public, providing some accountability and
checking some arbitrariness. Moreover, the class action is a more effective deterrent
than an individual suit.70 The welfare official is better checked by a classwide
injunction securing the named plaintiff and others against future wrongdoing, than by
68. See, e.g., Kettleson, Caseload Control, 34 NLADA BRIEFCASE 111, 113 (1977).
69. See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 399-402 (1975); see also United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445
U.S. 388, 397-98 (1980); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 110 n.11 (1975).
70. The deterrent effect of a class suit may be particularly important when compensation of plaintiff's claims is not
feasible. See Dam, Class Actions: Efficiency, Compensation, Deterrence, and Conflict of Interest, 4 J. LEG L STUD. 47,
54-56, 60-61 (1975); Denvir, supra note 55, at 1136.
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a resolution of the particular client's entitlement claim to that month's welfare pay-
ment. Finally, the increased clout the poor client obtains when he or she has a group
of others behind him or her means that class action suits will often be more effective
for even individual complainants than suits which are individually filed.
Second, the legal problems of individual poor people may be institutional in
nature, requiring institutional change to secure a given poor person's legal rights. 7
Consider the poor person who experiences periodic and increasing delays in obtaining
Social Security payments. The source of the problem may be management and budget
policies, which may not be remediable by even a hundred successful individual suits.
Institutional change rarely results from individual suits because individual problems
are not traceable much beyond the particular administrative officials with whom the
client has dealt personally.
Such considerations should lead equal access proponents to recognize that
group-oriented approaches to poverty law often obtain better results for the individual
poor clients. Of more concern to us, though, is to demonstrate to equal access
proponents that their approach does not necessarily rule out all group-oriented case
selection procedures. Not every calculation in terms of group impact is an unjustifi-
able denial of the access rights of poor persons who are turned away by such pro-
cedures. It is not inconsistent for Legal Services lawyers to claim to be serving the
interests of the poor as a group as well as the interests of individual poor clients when
these lawyers engage in group litigation.
III. THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCARCE LEGAL RESOURCE ALLOCATION
Marshall Breger has voiced perhaps the most detailed philosophical objections
to group impact decision procedures employed in poverty law programs.7 2 Although
many of his arguments have been made by earlier equal access proponents,73 he
brings together the chief conceptual points that such proponents have used to criticize
publicly funded group litigation for the poor. We begin this section of our Article
with a thorough philosophical examination of Breger's arguments, which can be
summarized as follows:
(1) The judicial process in America is a monopoly due to control by the state.
This, then, limits the extent to which individuals can successfully resolve disputes on
their own.
71. See Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976); Fiss, The Supreme
Court, 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1979).
If the law were enforced by officials with greater frequency, as in civil-law countries, part of the need currently being
met by private class action litigation would be eliminated. However, little progress toward governmental enforcement has
been made. See Taylor & Head, Representing Collective Interests in Civil Litigation: A Comparative Synopsis, 58 U.
Dur. J. UtB. L. 587 (1981); see also Dam, supra note 70, at 66-70. Moreover, the results of public enforcement have led
some to urge that the role of private group and class actions should be increased to foster pluralistic protection of the
individual interests at stake. See Cappelletti, Governmental and Private Advocates for the Public Interest in Civil
Litigation: A Comparative Study, 73 MICH. L. REv. 794, 831-68 (1975).
72. Breger, supra note 16.
73. See E. JOHNSON, supra note 5, at 10-14, 247-48.
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(2) The right to counsel is a procedural right which guarantees that individuals
have access to the legal process. Without counsel, individuals would be at a great
disadvantage in the monopolistic legal system.
(3) The right to access to the legal system, which entails the right to counsel, is
an entitlement based on what is due each and every citizen of a country that has a
monopoly on the legal system; these rights are not merely socially useful devices.
(4) Rights can only be overridden by other rights claims. All denials of a right
must have another (or the same) strong competing right as the basis for their justifica-
tion. A mere increase in social utility is never strong enough to override an in-
dividual's right to legal access.
(5) Since there are not, and are unlikely ever to be, enough funds to provide for
counsel to all who cannot pay for legal counsel, someone's legal access rights will
always be denied. Considerations of group impact or utility cannot be used to de-
termine which persons are to receive the benefits these funds afford. Any such
numerical calculation violates the basic entitlements and dignity of those individual
poor persons thereby deprived of legal access.
(6) In scarcity situations, failure to provide for each person's access right is not
necessarily a denial of respect for these citizens as persons. A system of distribution
that puts equal weight on each potential client's complaint maintains respect for
persons. Group impact allocation systems, insofar as they put unequal weight on
some complaints, fail to respect the rights of the poor.
We agree with Breger that the state has an effective monopoly over the court
system in America. This means that most attempts to resolve problems through
private means are stymied by the fact that one party can always appeal to a court of
law and force the other party to renegotiate through the state-run process. We also
agree that if one does not have legal counsel in this state-run system of justice, one is
at a great disadvantage. The legal process in America is inordinately complex and the
methods of pleading are generally not comprehensible even to well-educated citizens.
Furthermore, while we support Breger's argument that each citizen has a right of
access to the court system and that this entails a right to counsel even in civil cases,
we disagree with Breger that this right is merely procedural in nature.
Our major disagreement with Breger concerns his contention that any numerical
calculations violate the access rights of those poor people thereby denied legal ser-
vices. Breger claims to derive this position from the assumption that only rights
claims can override other rights claims. We agree that rights generally should not be
overridden by mere considerations of utility. But we fail to see why rights theory
would rule out scarce resource allocation procedures that attempt to maximize the
fulfillment of access rights claims. We will support the contrary contention that at
least some group impact case selection procedures do not fall prey to the standard
rights-based arguments against utility calculations employed by Breger. To reach this
conclusion, we first dispute the contention advanced by Breger that rights theory
requires that exactly equal weight be placed on the complaints of each poor person,
by showing that exactly equal treatment would not maintain respect for persons.
Furthermore, we argue that group-impact allocation procedures need not be seen as
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utilitarian if their purpose is to maximize rights fulfillment rather than preference
satisfaction. Equal access proponents should come to see that some group-impact
case selection procedures are compatible with a concern for the rights of poor per-
sons.
A. Procedural Rights and Welfare Rights
When the OEO first funded a legal services program in 1970, the mandate given
to this program was to "[e]nsure use of the judicial system and the administrative
process to effect changes in laws and institutions which unfairly and adversely affect
the poor."'74 Thus, from the beginning, the federally funded poverty law program was
directed to serve the interests of the poor as a group, not just to serve individual
clients who merely happened to be poor. The chief practical reason for this has been
that Congress has never been willing to fund fully all of the legal needs of poor
persons. Goodman and Walters pointed out that
[in 1975 there were approximately 11.2 lawyers for every 10,000 persons above the
federal poverty line. Even with over $100 million in federal subsidies, there was less than
one lawyer for every 10,000 people below the poverty line. Only about 15% of the legal
problems of the poorest segment of the population receive any kind of legal attention. 75
The scarcity of legal counsel makes it plausible that some type of collective resource
allocation procedure is warranted to increase the number of legal problems of the
poor that can be handled by available services.
One of Breger's assumptions is that access rights, and the right to counsel
entailed by them, are of a higher standing than are welfare concerns such as eliminat-
ing poverty. According to him, it is an unjustified denial of access rights to turn
clients away based merely on such welfare considerations. Yet Breger offers no
convincing argument to show that we should conceive of things in this way. Why is
not welfare also something which is a matter of right in American society? Why
should the right to subsistence food and housing be seen as less important than the
right to equal access to the legal process? And why cannot the right to equal access
itself be justified by reference to welfare considerations? It is to these basic con-
ceptual questions, largely left unaddressed by Breger's analysis, that we now turn.
According to Breger, rights are individualistic in that they are justified in-
dependently of, and are often opposed to, the collective goals of the community. He
claims that to "say that X has a right to Y is to give X a claim to Y regardless of the
utility of doing so."'76 Yet, the form of a right thus does not immediately rule out the
possibility that both equal access and welfare are rights. Breger admits this point but
74. Dep'ts of Labor, and Health, Education, and Welfare, and Related Agencies Appropriations for Fiscal Year
1971: Hearings on H.R. 18515 Before the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Appropriations, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. pt. 2,
at 534 (1970).
75. Bellow & Kettleson, From Ethics to Politics: Confronting Scarcity and Fairness in Public Interest Practice, 58
B.U.L. REv. 337, 342 n.26 (1978), citing L. GOODMAN & M. WALTERS, THE LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAM: RESOURCE
DISTRIBUTION AND THE LOW INCOME POPULATION 11-59 (1975).
76. Breger, supra note 16, at 292.
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he maintains that if this is so, it is nonetheless true that equal access and welfare are
rights of very different types. Breger's argument is stated as follows:
[T]he right to legal assistance has been declared an "inherent right of a citizen" in that
"individuals can hardly be expected to live under and respect the law unless they have an
opportunity to use it." Thus the right to counsel may be defined as a civil or juridical right
rather than a welfare right.77
Such civil rights are granted to citizens to protect their interests,78 whereas a welfare
right is a social right of the sort that rights to adequate food, shelter, and clothing
are. 7 9 Breger is justifiably wary of recognizing welfare rights, but nothing in his
article rules out this possibility.
Yet, if Breger admits that there are welfare rights, such as the right to have
sufficient food, shelter, and clothing, he must then explain why appeals to such rights
cannot justify denials of equal access rights. He appears to imply that "inherent rights
of citizens" are more important than mere "welfare rights," because if individual
citizens do not have their civic freedoms guaranteed above all else, democratic
decisionmaking cannot take place. It seems to us implausible that an individual's
right to obtain counsel is generally more important than having sufficient food,
shelter, and clothing (welfare rights) provided. To paraphrase an argument by Henry
Shue,80 if basic economic needs are not met, what is to prevent a government from
holding one's other rights hostage in exchange for those economic necessities? Some
economic rights are as basic to our security from governmental tyranny as are certain
political or civil rights. Indeed, the main conceptual distinction should be between
those political or economic rights which are basic to security and those political or
economic rights that are not.81 Without the protection of all our basic rights, the
protection of procedural rights alone will have little effect.
Moreover, those access rights which are vitally important for the maintenance of
our system of government are both politically and economically basic. They are
politically basic insofar as they provide the means of each citizen to express himself
or herself through the chief political mechanism of conflict resolution. But they are
also economically basic in that they provide, especially to the poor, the legal means
to defend their basic economic interests (most importantly those concerning food,
housing, and income) against those who hold economic power in the society.
The conceptual distinction between procedural rights and welfare considerations
begins to break down when it is recognized that some procedural rights are important
for economic as well as political reasons. It is then possible to argue that basic
77. Id. at 289 (footnotes omitted).
78. Id. at 289 n.39.
79. See id.; Gordley, Variations on a Modern Theme, in TOWARD EQUAL JusTicE 77, 85-88, 109-12 (1975), cited
in Breger, supra note 16, at 289 n.39.
80. H. StuE, BASIC RIGHTS 22-34 (1980).
81. As Breger notes, Rawls makes a similar distinction between primary social goods, which parallel basic liberties,
and secondary goods, which are prerequisites to realizing other rights or interests and to ensuring equality of opportunity.
Breger, supra note 16, at 293.
1984]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
procedural rights, such as the poor's right to equal access to the legal system, are
themselves at least partially justified by reference to collective economic well-being,
that is, by reference to welfare considerations. Furthermore, basic economic rights,
such as the right to subsistence food, clothing, and shelter, are also at least partially
justified by reference to political or procedural justice for the individuals who happen
to be poor. Thus, claims to equal access rights cannot hold independently of welfare
considerations, and certainly they are not opposed to welfare considerations. It may
then be argued that not all calculations which look to the collective goals of a
community of poor persons are unalterably opposed to the access rights of individual
poor persons. It is not conceptually implausible to believe that equal access rights can
be the subject of allocation schemes that are oriented toward the collective goals of a
group of poor persons. However, concern for individual dignity may suggest that
random allocation schemes which center on individual cases be used, even if a
concern for equal access does not.
B. Equal Opportunity and Case Selection Procedures
A number of authors writing about scarce medical resources have argued in a
similar vein with Breger that respect for the individual transcendent dignity of each
person requires that these persons be provided equal opportunity to receive scarce
resources. James Childress, for instance, has argued that a "first come, first served"
or lottery method of allocating scarce lifesaving medical resources is the only way to
preserve respect for persons and human dignity.8 2 If we take into account who each
person is, what contributions that person is likely to make to the social good, or what
responsibilities that person has to family, or friends, or even the nation in deciding to
whom to give lifesaving medical resources, we fail to give each person that respect
which each person deserves merely by being human. These utilitarian considerations
submerge what is transcendent and unique about each person into that person's social
role, thereby denying to each person the dignity that should be afforded to him or her
alone. Equal opportunity and equal rights cannot be preserved through such utilitarian
distributional schemes.8 3
We will advance two arguments against the equal opportunity critique of utili-
tarian calculations used in the allocation of scarce resources. First, we will contend
that equal opportunity does not entail radical equality of treatment, that is, exactly
equal treatment of each person. Second, we will contend that the cases of medicine
and law are not formally analogous in any event, precisely because of the ability of a
lawyer to handle more than one client's problems through one suit. While Breger
does not support totally random decision procedures in legal services allocation,
consideration of Childress' stronger position will allow us to see what is at stake more
clearly when equal opportunity arguments are advanced against utilitarian calculation
schemes.
82. Childress, Who Shall Live When Not All Can Live?, 53 SOUNDINGs 339, 347-54 (1970).
83. Id.
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If two people apply for a job it is not more protective of their individual dignities
to flip a coin to decide whom to hire than to determine which person best meets a
rational set of criteria designed to pick the best worker. Concern for equality and
respect for persons, as Ronald Dworkin and others have argued at great length, does
not necessarily entail exactly equal treatment.8 4 Indeed, exactly equal treatment (in
this case, an exactly equal chance of getting the scarce job) fails to take account of
just those personal differences which must be considered if people are to be treated as
unique and autonomous members of a moral community. Treating people as if there
were no differences between them does not respect their individuality. Random
methods take no account of personal circumstance, degree of need or merit, as well as
a host of other factors based on uniqueness of individuals. It is true that irrelevant
differences among persons should not be used as a basis for distinguishing among
them. But not all differences are irrelevant to modes of treatment such as hiring
practices. Random selection procedures completely fail to capture any of the relevant
differences among persons and hence treat these persons as mere faceless numbers,
hardly a practice which generally would preserve or protect individual dignity.
Childress argues that any attempt to provide non-medical criteria of selection in
scarce lifesaving medical resource cases would fail to treat individuals with the
respect they deserve.8 5 Instead, each person should be seen as having equal claims on
these resources based on his or her equal need. To employ other non-medical criteria
is to elevate one person's need over that of another. Since to do so effectively
condemns one person to death, this practice would utterly fail to respect these persons
as equals. When two rights of equal weight conflict, we cannot treat the persons fairly
by considering less important factors in deciding which right to respect. Random
criteria at least preserve the equality among persons to which their equal rights claims
entitle them. But we contend that this is only true when there is no other relevant
basis for distinguishing among these persons which would preserve respect for the
values their rights claims are supposed to advance.
Childress has only established that allocation decisions based on irrelevant dif-
ferences among persons fail to provide concern for equality and dignity. In medicine
what should count as a relevant difference among persons, after it has been de-
termined that all candidates do have roughly equal medical need for a scarce re-
source, is hard to determine. These choices are made all the more difficult by the fact
that such medical decisions concern life and death matters. Hence, deciding to em-
ploy a certain criterion to refuse treatment to one person is in fact to condemn that
person to die. In law, decisions about allocating scarce resources rarely have such
drastic results. Thus, the decision to employ a certain criterion for refusing legal
service to one person who needs it does not necessarily create an irreversible predica-
ment for that individual. For instance, the person denied legal help for his or her
divorce in May can reapply in December with considerable but not devastating
consequences due to the initial denial of service. This means that allocation schemes
84. R. DwoRKIN, supra note 57, at 227.
85. Childress, supra note 82, at 348-50.
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in law are not as likely to be all-or-nothing matters as they are when lifesaving
medical resources are allocated, and also not as likely to be disrespectful of individual
dignity.
Scarce resource allocation in medicine is not properly analogous to that in law,
precisely because law cases can concern more than one individual person, whereas
medical decisions rarely concern treatment which may directly alleviate the suffering
of more than one person at a time. As we will next indicate, group-oriented calcula-
tions about the allocation of scarce legal resources do not necessarily all turn out to be
utilitarian calculations. Unlike medicine, a single legal case can meet more than one
individual's rights claim. Yet the time an attorney spends in vindicating ten people's
rights claims in one suit will rarely equal that spent in adjudicating ten or even fewer
rights claims through individual cases. Thus, consideration of group impact is rele-
vant for legal allocation decisions in ways that it is not for medical decisions.
C. Maximizing Equal Access
Breger maintains that it is a denial of the right to equal access for poverty law
attorneys to decide which cases to take based on social utility or any other considera-
tion that would look to the needs of groups of clients rather than to those of in-
dividuals. Consideration of the following three hypothetical cases (based largely on
decisions which are commonly made by Legal Services attorneys) will show that
Breger's conclusion is implausible even assuming his equal access perspective.
Case 1.-Two prospective clients arrive at a Legal Services office each seeking
legal counsel. The first person wants to get a divorce from his or her spouse, while
the second wants to challenge the gas company's shutoff policy following nonpay-
ment of bills. Breger would maintain that it is unfair to allow the poverty lawyer to
make the decision of which case to take (assuming that he or she can only take one
case). According to him, the party who is turned away can legitimately complain that
his or her rights have not been taken seriously as rights, since they have been
overridden by the lawyer's utility calculations. If a lottery had been used, or if it
could be shown that one person's rights claim was of higher standing than that of the
other (perhaps because it was an emergency, while the other claim could wait), or if
one person voluntarily decided to step aside in favor of the other, or if all poor
persons relegated this kind of decision to a citizen board in advance, then, as Breger
would have it, the right to access to one of those persons would not necessarily be
infringed. For him, distinguishing one case on its subject matter unjustly rewards the
rights claim of the other person.
Case 2.-Eleven prospective clients arrive at a Legal Services office each seek-
ing legal counsel. The first person wants to get a divorce from his or her spouse,
while the second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth, and
eleventh clients want to challenge their gas company's shutoff policy. Again the
lawyer can only handle one case-which case should he or she take and what con-
siderations is he or she allowed to make in determining an answer according to
Breger's conceptual analysis? Given the fact that the lawyer can provide counsel to
ten of the prospective clients by handling any one of their complaints as a class action
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suit, and thereby provide access to all ten of these people, it seems counterintuitive to
maintain that this consideration should not weigh heavily in the lawyer's decision.
If one places access to the legal system high on one's list of goods or values in a
society, as Breger surely does, then a decision that provides this good for ten and
denies it to one is surely better than a decision that provides it to one and denies it for
ten. Or to use rights terminology, handling the gas company case as a class action
would meet more access rights and deny the least number of access rights claims.
Even in a universe where only rights claims can legitimately override other rights
claims, the numbers should count in the sense that the option of providing for more
rights fulfillment would override the option of providing less rights fulfillment. This
conclusion is seemingly consistent with Breger's strong emphasis on equal access.
Case 3.-Two prospective clients arrive at a Legal Services office each seeking
legal counsel. The first person wants to get a divorce from his or her spouse, while
the second person wants to challenge the gas company's shutoff policy. The Legal
Services attorney has good reasons for believing that at least nine other people in the
community would also want to change the gas company's policy but they have not yet
presented themselves to the Legal Services attorney in the office. Should this case be
viewed as closer to case one or to case two? Should the lawyer disregard the fact that
there are at least ten people whose legal needs will be met by handling the gas
company suit instead of the divorce? Is it a denial of the right to access of the first
person, or is it a justified overriding of his or her right in order to maximize access
rights? On Breger's own grounds it is justified, indeed perhaps even required, that the
lawyer choose to handle the suit which will provide the greatest fulfillment of access
rights. Again, if such a high value is placed on the mere fulfillment of access rights,
one need not look to social utility to show that some calculations based on group
impact can be justified.
Conceptually, Breger has confused two rather different kinds of calculations.
The first is the standard utilitarian calculation that looks only to the preferences or
interests of the greatest number of people in attempting to maximize well-being or
happiness. The second is the calculation that looks to the rights of individuals but
recognizes that these rights are not all unique. This second calculation recognizes that
many people or even groups of people may have similar rights claims. It would
require that, where possible, such claims be joined in order to maximize the fulfill-
ment of these rights claims, or at least to minimize their infringement.
Appeals to access rights will not allow Breger to block this second kind of
calculation since it maximizes the fulfillment of these access rights. Perhaps it could
be shown that allowing the rights of many to override the right of one is to treat this
one person as not fully human. However, not even Breger contends that each denial
of right constitutes disrespect, for he maintains that a right may be respectfully
overridden if one can show that a more important right conflicts with it.86 Rights
claims stand high in our universe of moral discourse because rights are thought to
86. Breger, supra note 16, at 292.
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protect individuals from being treated as means for the majority's benefit. But not
every overriding of rights automatically signals a denial of respect for the person
involved. If such denials must occur so that the rights of many are not denied, and if
the rights of the many as well as the rights of the one person are the same type of
right, then it does not seem to be disrespectful to deny the right of the one to protect
the rights of the many.
D. Group-Impact Allocations and Rights Theory
Breger maintains throughout his essay that any attempt to allocate legal re-
sources by reference to group impact is the kind of utilitarian calculation that is
incompatible with access rights theory. 87 In this section we will argue that certain
numerical calculations are not incompatible with what is at the basis of rights theory.
Rights theory does not require that we disregard the number of individuals whose
rights claims are affected in allocation decisions.
Underlying any rights theory is the idea that each person should count for one
and only one, that is, that each person should be afforded equal respect-not equal
respect when compared with ten other people all also viewed as persons, but equal
respect with each other person, each seen as just one other person. When there are no
relevant differences among persons we may flip coins to decide the outcome because
that gives each person an exactly equal chance of getting the desired outcome. In
these cases we have no basis for distinguishing among individuals, and any non-
relevant basis would provide less opportunity to one or another of these persons,
thereby failing to treat that person equally to each of the others. Is it true that the
number of people who have a right is irrelevant, and if considered, would fail to treat
the persons involved with equal respect?
Consider a lifeboat case where we can either save one person (who needs three
gallons of water) or we can save three persons (each of whom needs only one gallon).
Assume that there is no relevant basis for distinguishing among them and that each
has a right to life which entails that we should do that which is necessary to save their
lives, if we can do so without major loss of something morally valuable to us. That is,
each has a right to life and a corresponding right to be saved. But we are in a situation
of scarcity-not all can be saved. Either one can be saved and the other three die, or
the three can be saved and the one dies. As we have suggested, this situation is closer
to that facing the Legal Services lawyer, than the medical scenario where only two
persons are involved. So that we do not beg the question, also assume that the only
thing which is relevant in this case is the right to be saved, and no amount of social
good can override this right for any person. We will show that, by appealing to rights
theory alone, it is permissible to decide the issue by choosing the greatest number
rather than the one person to be saved.
Those who deny our thesis seem to be committed to the following premise: "If
one person is harmed, that would be just as bad as if any number are each equally
harmed. 88 But what could possibly support such a view? One might try to claim that
87. Id. at 287, 295, 340, 344.
88. See Taurek, Should the Numbers Count?, 6 PHIL. & PUB. Api. 293 (1977).
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the harms of the larger number cannot be summed, that they must be taken and
compared with the harm to each, one by one, and in this scenario it would never be
justified to pick the one over the other.89 But again, why must we be limited to this
non-aggregative view of harms? Rights theory does not rule out all group-oriented
allocation procedures.
Perhaps it could be argued that the harm of having a right overridden is a harm of
the sort which is of overwhelming significance regardless of how many persons are so
affected. Is this plausible? If we look at it from the perspective of any one person who
might be so harmed, it might appear that this is so. Most would not agree to suffer so
that others will not have to suffer, and this is surely the case when a person's own life
is at stake. But how does this person explain his or her position to the others who each
must suffer, especially when that person suffers equally to what each of the others
would have suffered? It would appear to the others that their collective suffering, and
in the case at hand, their loss of lives, is not worth what the loss of life was worth to
the one. To say, for instance, that Jones' suffering is equal to the suffering of three is
to say that the suffering of any one of the three is only equal to one-third of Jones'
suffering-and this would surely not be to treat each person with equal respect.
Furthermore, if we let the numbers count then we can say that Jones' suffering is
not equal to the suffering of the three. Instead, Jones' suffering is equal to only the
suffering of one-third of the three (where each suffers equally), and this would
seemingly preserve the sense in which we respect each person's suffering or loss of
rights equally. No person will be given enough weight to his or her own (equal)
suffering so as to override the suffering of more than one. To disallow quantification
is to deny the thesis, thought to be essential to rights theory, that each person is to be
treated with equal respect. As Derek Parfit quite succinctly puts it: "Why do we save
the larger number? Because we do give equal weight to saving each. Each counts for
one. That is why more count for more."90 Only if we were also to allow that
individual rights could be overridden by the weaker interests of others would we be
vulnerable to the charge that we had slipped from the maximization of rights to the
maximization of preferences, and only then would we be vulnerable to the charge that
we had not taken rights, and respect for persons, seriously. Looking to the group
impact, in seeking to minimize the number of those whose rights will be denied, is
not the kind of utilitarian concern which is incompatible with what has traditionally
been the basis for rights theory.
E. The Benefits of Group-Oriented Decisionmaking
We have shown that group-oriented case selection procedures and litigation
strategies are not inherently inconsistent with a concern for individual rights. Indeed
we will now briefly show that such procedures and strategies perform useful roles in
maximizing access, given the nature of much poverty litigation. First, and perhaps
89. Derek Parfit, responding to Taurek's article, supra note 88, argues that, to be at all defensible, this must be one's
position. Parfit, Innumerate Ethics, 7 PIL. & PUB. AFF. 285 (1978).
90. Parfit, supra note 89, at 301.
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most obviously, such procedures and strategies are often the most efficient way to
vindicate rights. Second, group litigation procedures and strategies increase the
likelihood that conflicting concerns among the poor, particularly about appropriate
remedies, can at least be considered by the adjudicator. Third, the poor have unique
common concerns, which give them interests as a group, interests which cannot
wholly be responded to even through repetitive individual litigation. Finally, many
government and other institutional adversaries of the poor treat the poor as a group,
and their invidious actions can only be effectively met by strategies which recognize
and respond to such group treatment.
The aggregation of rights claims into a single suit may not only maximize rights,
as we have shown, but also may be the most efficient way to settle disputes between
the poor and their opponents. Even equal access proponents, such as Breger, admit
that efficiency considerations are relevant "insofar as they have an impact on the
quest for procedural justice." 91 Moreover, such proponents do not deny that certain
efficiency considerations, e.g., whether the client's claim can succeed, 92 can be used
in deciding to whom scarce legal resources will be allocated.
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure adopts such efficiency con-
siderations as its primary rationale. 93 The aggregation of individual claims avoids
duplication in discovery, pleading, and trial preparation. Rule 23 not only permits a
saving of judicial resources, but it also allows attorneys to save time by litigating a
case on behalf of a class rather than trying each case separately. The resulting savings
in attorney time can, in the Legal Services context, redound to the benefit of those
clients who would not otherwise be served because they requested or needed services
after the program's capacity at any particular time had been reached.
Furthermore, many recent civil rights cases have illustrated that group litigation
is the only means to ensure that an appropriate remedy can be provided. As we have
previously noted, poor people's problems often result from institutional un-
responsiveness. The poor are generally dependent on governmental agencies for
many of their basic needs such as welfare, medical care, and public housing. The
poor, more often than the non-poor, are also opposed by private institutions such as
nursing homes, mental health facilities, and housing corporations. In the individual
case, evidentiary considerations limit the framework for the court's decisions, and
precedent circumscribes the scope of relief which the court may order to vindicate an
individual's claim. 94 Often, such relief is retrospective only, even when realistically
speaking, the illegal practices are bound to recur.
91. Breger, supra note 16, at 286 n.19.
92. Id. at 357.
93. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee note.
94. Coley v. Clinton, 635 F.2d 1364, 1378 (8th Cir. 1980) (Rule 23(b)(2) requirement of commonality of relief is to
be read liberally in civil rights class actions in keeping with the Rule's purpose of vindicating civil rights); Senter v.
General Motors Corp., 532 F.2d 511, 525-26 (6th Cir.) (class action appropriate for allegations of classwide discrimina-
tion because of common evidence and need for single injunctive remedy), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 870 (1976); EEOC v.
Printing Indus. of Metropolitan Washington, D.C., Inc., 92 F.R.D. 51, 54 (D.D.C. 1981) (allegations of employment
discrimination are inherently class action suits); Bryan v. Amrep Corp., 429 F. Supp. 313, 318 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (class
action superior to other procedures when plaintiffs have a common legal grievance, and time, effort, and expense would
be saved thereby).
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Second, even though somewhat limited, the precedential impact of an individual
lawsuit may affect the interests of other poor persons who are not heard in the suit.
Recent class action litigation has demonstrated that a narrow definition of the plaintiff
class may exclude participation of people who have legitimate interests in the out-
come of the suit. Such litigation may artificially restrict the facts and remedies which
the court may consider in framing relief. For instance, in Halderman v. Pennhurst
State School & Hospital95 conditions in a Pennsylvania institution for the mentally
retarded were challenged. 96 Narrow definition of the class to include only in-
stitutionalized individuals and their guardians ad litem resulted in a sweeping judicial
remedy which effectively closed down the Pennhurst facility. 97 This remedy was later
challenged by parents not consulted in the original case, who claimed to be injured
because their children could no longer remain in Pennhurst. 98 Similarly, individual
litigation such as the Bakke9 9 case may cause the reordering of legal relationships of
many who cannot, for one reason or the other, establish their right to different
treatment based on their individual circumstances. This is particularly problematical
because the poor generally lack funding (given LSC's scarce resources) to vindicate
their rights to different treatment by distinguishing their own situations.
Third, the poor have common economic interests which are often in jeopardy in
civil suits. Such common interests result from the unique difficulty which the poor
have in meeting their minimum needs. It is surely true that the "package" of what
counts as minimum needs is not the same from society to society or from time to
time. 1o Such variations do not indicate that the poor in any given society have no
unique and common interest in meeting their needs. For instance, in advanced socie-
ties where electricity and natural gas for heating are considered minimum needs, the
poor, like everyone else, must pay more for these services when utility rates increase.
95. 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979) (en banc), rev'd, 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
96. Id. at 88-89.
97. Id. at 90, 116; see Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. REv. 1183, 1211-12 (1982). See
generally Bell, Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85
YALE L.J. 470, 482-87 (1976) (discussing conflicts among class members, attorneys, and unrepresented parties in three
school desegregation cases).
98. Rhode, supra note 97, at 1211-12, 1225, 1252, 1259 nn.288 & 289.
99. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). In Bakke the Supreme Court invalidated the
University of California-Davis Medical School's special admission policy, which allowed minority applicants to meet
lower admissions standards until a quota was met, as violative of either the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment to the United States Constitution, id. at 320 (opinion of Powell, J.), orTitle VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
as amended (42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976)), id. at 421 (opinion of Stevens, J.).
100. Some economists have argued that the difficulty in defining poverty is reason for regarding it as merely a
subjective, relative, or ethical term with little real descriptive meaning. See Orshansky, How Poverty Is Measured,
MONrHLY LAB. REV., Feb. 1969, at 37, 37. However, the approach of Amartya Sen in Poverty and Famines: An Essay
on Entitlement and Deprivation (1981) recommends itself. Sen argues that poverty should be defined on the basis of
standards measuring minimum needs, those necessary to escape the kind of economic deprivation that leads to hunger and
starvation. A. SEN., POVERTY AND FAMINES 24-38 (1981). Although one need not be a member of the group of poor
people throughout one's whole life in the way members of other disadvantaged groups (e.g., blacks or women) are
immutably locked into those groups, at any given time it is possible to determine that a person is unable to meet minimum
needs. Welfare officials have been making these calculations for some time, and economists and social scientists
recognize the minimum needs standard in identifying the poor. See, e.g., Sneden, The Measurement and Definition of
Poverty, in POVERTY: A PSYCHOSOCIAL ANALYSIS 2, 3-6 (L. Sneden ed. 1970); B. SCHILLER, THE ECONOMICS OF
POVERTY AND DISCRIMINATION 11-22 (3d ed. 1980) (discussing various poverty indicators).
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Unlike all other persons, however, those who are poor must dip into the money they
have reserved for other minimum needs in order to pay for the increase in utility
costs, or go without minimum electricity or heat. All members of a society have some
interest in the price of providing for their minimal needs. Yet the poor have a
uniquely pressing interest in these matters since the poor can pay for these increases
only by going without other minimum needs.
The common interests of the poor create a situation in which group impact
litigation will have at least an indirect effect on all of the poor in a given region.
Thus, any conflict that might exist between the interests of an individual who has
been turned down for legal services and the interests of the group who will be made
the object of a class action suit is somewhat mitigated. The poor person who is turned
down for service for a divorce is quite likely to be benefitted by a case which seeks to
challenge utility rate increases. While it is true that the divorce may be more impor-
tant to that person than the rate increase, it is nonetheless true that his or her interests,
which include an interest in the rate increase, are not strictly in conflict with the
interests of the people who want to challenge the utility rate increase through a class
action.
The poor also face problems which do not seem to constitute severe enough
difficulties for any particular individuals to warrant litigation, but which have an
adverse impact on a group of the poor taken collectively. Think of the decision not to
construct a public housing project in a certain neighborhood. Such a decision may
have a severe adverse effect on all of the residents of their neighborhood. But if we
try to separate these harms and address them as harms to individuals, such that we are
only concerned in a given case with the effects of this decision on one member of this
community, the harm is not the sort that seems likely to be taken seriously by a judge.
It is very difficult to predict that a given poor person would have been eligible to get
into a public housing complex, and what harm that person suffers because he or she
now is not in that corm.plex. The harm, though, is fairly easy to see when the whole
group of neighbors is 'considered. Without the new complex, overcrowding and
inadequate housing create difficulties for every member of the neighborhood; and
ancillary problems of crime and sanitation, well-known in overcrowded areas, be-
come real possibilities.
In similar ways, the unresolved legal problems of the poor perpetuate and
contribute to poverty in America. But poverty itself is bard to understand as the plight
of isolated individuals. It is even more difficult to remedy when our attention is fixed
on the individual case. Let us only reiterate the most obvious factor here. When
individual suits are filed, defendants commonly try to settle out of court. These
settlements often effectively pay off the individual poor person, but leave the cause of
the problem untouched for this individual and most especially for those others sim-
ilarly situated. This is the converse of the problem of precedent we mentioned before.
Out-of-court settlements do not even afford the slight relief that court-supervised
settlements offer to those unnamed in the suit.
Finally, the poor more often than the non-poor face institutional opponents in
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legal proceedings. 10 1 These institutional opponents tend to view the poor as a class.
In this context, think of the food stamp program. The regulations promulgated affect
every person whose income is under the federal poverty line.' 0 2 If a decision is made
to lower eligibility standards, then every person who falls between the old eligibility
line and the new line, regardless of differences in individual situations, is affected by
that decision. A class is created by the actions of the food stamp director. It is true
that not all of the poor are here treated as a class, but the institutional opponent has
categorized situations in such a way that individual poor persons are not distinguished
except according to overly broad characteristics such as income.
The actions of the institutional officials in creating classes of poor individuals
require appropriate response from the legal system. We suggest that such response
cannot be made by characterizing adjudication according to an individualistic concep-
tion of law. Civil lawsuits are often characterized, especially by rights theorists, as
involving essentially private disputes between discrete, individual plaintiffs and de-
fendants. 10 3 The law is merely one of many ways that individuals may attempt to
settle their problems. The law enters only as a third party to the conflict between these
private parties.
However, when the parties in a case are an institution and the class it has
created, then the adjudication problem facing a judge is as much a political problem
as a problem of dispute resolution. In class action suits the named plaintiff is merely a
representative member of an aggrieved group. Class action suits explicitly recognize
that institutional actions create a pattern of treatment of a group of individuals. From
the earliest use of this type of suit, the interest which constitutes the group of litigants
has been something like their social status, something which was not understood to be
a feature of each individual member of the group qua individual.'
0 4
A group of poor tenants residing in a public housing project may be said to have
similar economic status, defined by their dependence on the public housing authority,
which creates problems of status rather than of rights for them as a group. By
101. Because the poor often face institutions as legal opponents, theirproblems are more difficult to solve than those
raised in a non-poor person's disputes, which are usually private. See Stumpf, supra note 5, at 721. In addition, the lawyer
may spend up to five times as much effort to solve a poor person's problem because of cultural and educational differences
between lawyer and client. See Developments in the La,--Conflicts of Interest in the Legal Profession, 94 HARV. L. REV.
1244, 1399 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Developments], citing Silver, The Imminent Failure of Legal Services for the
Poor: Why and How to Limit Caseload, 46 U. DEr. J. URn. L. 217, 220 (1969).
102. See 7 C.F.R. § 273.9(a)(2) (1983).
103. See Breger, supra note 16, at 287-88; Chayes, supra note 71, at 1282-83. Professors Fiss and Chayes have
definitively explicated the differences between a dispute resolution model and a broader model to which we refer, which
Piss denominates the structural reform model. See generally Fiss, supra note 71, at 2, 17-28.
104. The legal historian Stephen Yeazell contends that "[sleventeenth century group litigation is not about the legal
rights of aggrieved individuals but about the incidents of status flowing from membership in an agricultural community
not yet part of a market economy." Yeazell, Group Litigation and Social Context: Toward a History of the Class Action.
77 COLUM. L. REv. 866, 871 (1977). Yeazell argues further that contemporary class actions neither deal with, nor
concern, these clearly demarcated social classes but deal with groups of individuals bound together only by one common
interest, normally established by contractual rights, such as all those who buy Pintos and receive the express warranty of
safety. Id. at 894-96; see also Yeazell, From Group Litigation to Class Action Part 1: The Industrialization of Group
Litigation, 27 UCLA L. REv. 514, 517-20 (1980).
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contrast, when litigation is brought in behalf of all antibiotic purchasers, they are
regarded as a class only for convenience; they could be viewed as individuals with
similar problems without any loss of conceptual understanding of their legal prob-
lems. Yet, the class designation of the members of the public housing project is not
merely one which originates in convenience.
The welfare official or public housing administrator does not promulgate a
regulation or take action based on information about its effects on each and every
poor person within the ambit of a program. Rather the official weighs considerations
of the poor tenants as a homogeneous group against public concerns such as saving
money in order to implement sweeping changes that impact on all equally. The
benefits and burdens which such an official distributes are proffered in identical ways
to each member of the group, based solely on his or her membership in the group of
the poor, and not by individually considering whether any particular member of the
group should have received those benefits and burdens. These actions violate the
dictates of, or purposes behind, laws passed to aid the poor as a group. In such
circumstances, only legal responses which recognize the poor as a group will suf-
ficiently guard the interests of all members.
Class action litigation represents the most effective way to represent the interests
of the group as a whole. In the public housing example, the class action, particularly
under Rule 23(b)(2), will aid in establishing how the group-oriented perspective of
the housing authority has visited harms on some individuals, and is likely to do so on
others, because of broadened discovery and proof rules. By allowing the court to
remedy not only past injuries but also contemplated injuries to members of the group,
the class action device goes beyond the scope of the individual lawsuit, in which
rights and remedies flow only between individual persons who have caused or suf-
fered specific harms. In this way the class action suit can benefit poor individuals by
having an impact on the chief problem facing the poor as a group: their poverty.
IV. THE ETHICS OF RESTRICTIONS ON CASE ACCEPTANCE
AND STRATEGY DECISIONS
So far our dispute with equal access proponents has centered on issues in philo-
sophical ethics. Now we turn to the more practical issues of professional ethics
commonly faced by lawyers today. Supporters of Legal Services, as well as Amer-
ican Bar Association ethics officials, have maintained for some time that many
limitations on what Legal Services lawyers may do for clients, such as class action
restrictions, are unethical.1 05 However, Breger and other equal access critics of LSC
suggest that these restrictions are not unethical because no attorney is required to
accept all cases, or to pursue all possible strategies on behalf of a client. 106 Thus, they
105. See, e.g., 120 CONG. REC. 24,036 (1974); 119 CONG. REc. 20,703; 40,460; 40,760-62 (1973); cf. 119 CONG.
REc. 20,738 (1973) (statement of Rep. Meeds) (legislative advocacy); 119 CONG. REC. 20,702 (1973) (statement of Rep.
Abzug) (restrictions on legislative and administrative advocacy, provision of advice); ABA Comm. on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 334, reprinted in 60 A.B.A. J. 1273, 1275 (1974).
106. Breger, supra note 16, at 311.
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imply that statutory restrictions on Legal Services lawyers simply take away un-
necessary, and potentially pernicious, options which private attorneys may eschew by
choice.
These equal access proponents assume a model of legal ethics which we will
challenge. In their model, before case acceptance, the attorney is thought to have no
obligations. After he or she accepts a case, the attorney becomes merely the agent of
the client, who is the principal. We will contend that the Code of Professional
Responsibility supports neither of these assumptions. Instead, the Code and current
professional practice imply a partnership between attorney and client in, as well as
out of, Legal Services. In the partnership model, the attorney and client negotiate the
parameters of their relationship, based on mutual respect for their individual interests
and the obligations they may have. The LSC attorney has an important obligation of
public service, which often dictates group-oriented decisions on case selection and
strategy. Along with this obligation, the client's interest in preserving his or her
dignity must be reflected in case acceptance and strategy decisions.
As we will argue, when these interests are negotiated fairly by lawyer and client,
many of the client conflicts inherent in group representation can be resolved without
violating either the lawyer's or the client's interests. This negotiation may even
enhance the client's participatory rights. By contrast, we will show that congressional
restrictions on group representation by LSC violate both the lawyer's obligation of
public service and the client's interest in dignity.
A. Two Models of the Attorney-Client Relationship
The principal-agent model and the partnership model of the attorney-client
relationship make very different assumptions about the lawyer's obligations both
before and after case acceptance. In the principal-agent model, the private lawyer has
unlimited freedom before he or she accepts a case, and little freedom after case
acceptance, because he or she must serve only the client's interests. Because the
Legal Services lawyer is government-supported, he or she loses even the freedom of
choice which the private lawyer has in the case acceptance decision. By contrast, in
the partnership model, both the private lawyer and the Legal Services attorney have
obligations which limit their freedom in accepting cases, but they still retain some
discretion not only in accepting cases, but in directing their progress.
The principal-agent model assumes that the private attorney may accept or reject
cases based solely on personal interests or dislikes, or solely on the basis of who
walks through the office door looking for a lawyer. This assumption may stem in part
from early twentieth century constitutional theory that professionals should be
allowed to practice without government interference. 10 7 Equal access proponents
would contend that the Legal Services lawyer gives up these rights in selecting cases
when he or she agrees to work for a government-funded law firm.' 0 8 Rather than
107. See G. GUNTHER, supra note 33, at 502-03, 509-19.
108. See, e.g., Breger, supra note 16, at 326.
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having the freedom to reject a case for any reason whatsoever, the Legal Services
lawyer must put aside personal beliefs, personal interests, and other obligations.
Unless he or she does, the Legal Services lawyer will be subverting the statutory goal
of equal access, which requires the provision of legal services based solely on the
client's expressed desire for them.
According to the principal-agent model, both the private attorney and the Legal
Services lawyer take on obligations to their clients when the case is accepted. At that
point, they give up their freedom to make decisions and bind themselves to serve their
clients' interests exclusively. At the extreme, they must pursue any legal course
which the client chooses, regardless of its consequences, in order properly to
represent the client. 10 9 Nonetheless, the government may impose further restrictions
on Legal Services lawyers' activities because it provides the funds for these
activities. 11O
By contrast, the partnership model views the attorney-client relationship as a
negotiated and renegotiated agreement. This agreement is created from interests and
obligations that arise well before case acceptance, and continue to inform strategic
decisions in a case. The lawyer's and client's agreement on the scope of representa-
tion includes both the lawyer's professional obligations and personal interests and the
client's interests in being respected and in controlling the goals of the litigation.
Admittedly, the attorney's decision to accept the case changes the balance of in-
terests, with the individual client's interests taking on significantly more weight.
However, to suggest that the lawyer becomes merely a tool or a "hired gun" for the
client at the point of case acceptance is to belie both the Code's mandates and the
customs of current practice.
A glance at a typical business lawyer's relationship with his or her clients
underscores the fact that in much legal practice, attorneys and their clients perceive
themselves to be partners."1 The experienced client rarely uses the lawyer simply as
an agent to carry out instructions he or she may give. Often the client gives the lawyer
free rein, subject to the client's ultimate veto, to use his or her skills to solve a
problem, without questioning the cost or the methods the lawyer intends to use. For
example, the lawyer is often the one who initiates proposals to acquire property or
enter into business arrangements. Similarly, he or she may investigate and propose
litigation or lobbying based only on a general notion of what the client would like to
achieve. Since the client usually considers the attorney's opinions essential in making
decisions, that client will frequently defer to the attorney when the legality of a matter
is the central concern. Sophisticated clients recognize that the lawyer contributes time
and talents while the client contributes money and cooperation.
109. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-1, 7-2, 7-3 (1980); see also MODEL RULES OF PRO-
FESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.3 and comment (1983), reprinted in 52 U.S.L.W. 1, 4 (1983).
110. See Breger, supra note 16, at 310, 326.
111. G. HAZARD, ETHIcs IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 140-44 (1978); see also MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule f.2 comment (1983), reprinted in 52 U.S.L.W. 1, 3 (1983); ef. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBITY EC 2-17 (fee), 2-26 (unpopular causes) (1980).
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When the attorney exceeds his or her area of expertise, however, the client will
often remind the lawyer emphatically that some choices are business decisions,
thereby regaining significant control in the relationship. It is also not a rare phenom-
enon for lawyers to "fire" clients who ask for services which go beyond legal or
ethical limits, or even those that the lawyer feels ill equipped to handle or morally
bound not to undertake.
Such interaction is best understood as a partnership rather than a principal-agent
relationship. The attorney-client partnership may not be so transparent in Legal
Services practice. However, the LSC lawyer also often explores alternatives with
only a sketchy idea of the client's goals. The LSC client frequently expects such
independent initiative from his or her attorney for precisely the same reason the
business client relies on his or her attorney to suggest opportunities or solutions for
problems. Both recognize that the resolution of the legal aspects of their problems
may be central to resolving the problems themselves. Both respect the lawyer's skills
at analyzing the client's goals and proposing efficient, appropriate solutions. Yet the
participation of clients in gathering facts and taking action is critical in both contexts:
without the client's help, a resolution of the legal problem is unlikely. In addition,
just as the business client retains the right to make the ultimate decision about the
course of action to be taken, so the Legal Services client has the final choice of
options to be pursued to solve his or her legal problem.
Equal access proponents often intimate that private clients who believe that their
attorneys are intruding on "business decisions" hold the power of the purse as an
ultimate check on their attorneys' actions. By contrast, they would argue that Legal
Services clients have no way to stop their lawyers if the lawyers file class actions over
their protest or lobby against their wishes. Equal access proponents ignore the fact
that LSC clients may file grievances against their lawyers. 112 They similarly fail to
consider professional oversight from supervisors, project directors, and disciplinary
commissions, as well as both political oversight from local Legal Services boards113
and legal oversight from courts. These safeguards provide deterrents to overreaching
as powerful as the purse.
In our view, all lawyers must have respect for clients' interests, but all lawyers
also have personal interests in maintaining some control over the attorney-client
relationship. The private lawyer must reject some cases in order to develop and
diversify his or her skills. Similarly, the LSC lawyer must be able to reject some
persistent clients with only simple legal problems if he or she is to become a first-
class litigator. 114 For instance, the lawyer may never learn how to litigate properly a
child custody case, where the client's interest is substantial, if he or she concentrates
exclusively on delaying evictions briefly for all of the tenants behind in their rent who
112. See 45 C.F.R. pt. 1621 (1983).
113. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2996f(a)(7). (c) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
114. See Bellow, supra note 13, at 118.
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seek help with their cases. The interest in diverse case selection and control is not just
a matter of personal development; it is essential if the lawyer is to meet his or her
obligations under the Code of Professional Responsibility.
B. The Lawyer's Interests
Beyond the personal interests of both Legal Services and private lawyers, all
attorneys have affirmative and prohibitory ethical obligations 15 to the public in
addition to those owed to individual clients. Most lawyers recognize as an integral
part of their case selection and preparation process the significance of prohibitory
ethical obligations. For instance, reputable attorneys do not take cases which require
them to violate the law to achieve their client's goals or pursue cases in which the
client demands that they suborn perjury or harass opponents with unfounded discov-
ery and motions. 16 However, the Code's affirmative obligations to act in the public
interest are often neglected. These obligations, which include the obligations to
improve the legal system, to provide legal education to the public, and to make legal
services widely available, must necessarily play a part in case selection and strategy if
the Code is to be followed. Because of the scarcity of resources in the Legal Services
context, such obligations often dictate group-oriented decisions on case selection and
strategy.
In 1955, the Joint Conference on Professional Responsibility described the legal
professions's highest obligation as one to "procedures and institutions .... [It is] a
trusteeship for the integrity of those fundamental processes of government and self-
government which enable society to function."' 117 That paramount obligation to the
institution of law, rather than specific obligations to individual clients, is embodied in
the Code of Professional Responsibility's prescription that the lawyer "should partici-
pate in proposing and supporting legislation and programs to improve the [legal]
system, without regard to the general interests or desires of clients or former
clients."" 8 Lawyers must oppose any law, substantive or procedural, which "con-
tributes to an unjust result,"' 1 9 and support those changes that are "in the public
115. In referring to affirmative and prohibitory obligations, we do not distinguish the aspirational from the manda-
tory as does the Code. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY preliminary statement (1980). Rather, those
obligations, whether or not the subject of disciplinary action, which require the lawyer to act are distinguished from those
which prohibit action. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct acknowledge explicitly that many of the affirmative
obligations of lawyers, such as the obligation to provide pro bono services, are imperative and not subject to the discretion
of the attorney, even though they may not be proper subjects of discipline. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT preamble, Rule 6.1 comment (1983), reprinted in 52 U.S.L.W. 1, 1-2, 23 (1983).
116. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(A)(4)-(6); 2-103(E); 7-102(A)(1), (2),
(4), (7), (8) (1980); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 3.1, 3.3(a)(4), 3.4(b), (d) (1983), reprinted in 52
U.S.L.W. 1, 17-18 (1983).
117. Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1162 (1958) [hereinafter cited
as Joint Conference Report]. The responsibility of public service is conjoined with the obligation to make legal services
available.
118. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 8-1 (1980) (footnote omitted); but see MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUcr Rule 6.1 (1983), reprinted in 52 U.S.L.W. 1, 23 (1983), narrowing the scope of this considera-
tion to provision of, or support for, pro bono services or "service in activities for improving the law, the legal system or
the legal profession."
119. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 8-2 (1980).
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interest."12 The Model Rules of Professional Conduct, though more narrowly fo-
cused, continue the obligation to render public interest legal service, that is, pro bono
legal services or assistance in "improving the law, the legal system or the legal
profession."' 2 1 The obligation to improve the law entails the same commitment as
any other moral precept. Rather than erasing the lawyer's moral sensibilities and his
or her beliefs about what is just, as the equal access approach suggests, the obligation
to improve the law requires the lawyer to exercise good professional judgment. The
lawyer must make hard choices and must commit himself or herself to a position on
the fairness of a law or procedure, rather than hiding behind a client's wishes or
interests.
The Legal Services lawyer is not exempt from these obligations to improve
specific laws, the legal system, or the profession. By virtue of the special nature of
his or her practice, the LSC lawyer is often in the peculiar position of witnessing the
most compelling instances of arbitrary mistreatment by government. Ironically, this
mistreatment may result from good legislative intentions gone awry. 122 The Legal
Services lawyer often works with clients who need help coping with onerous welfare
reporting or workfare requirements ostensibly adopted to ensure that the poorest
receive help or to improve the dignity of their lives. The LSC lawyer often represents
those burdened by landlord-tenant laws which have become inequitable in present-
day economic circumstances. Just as frequently, however, the Legal Services lawyer
encounters one of the fundamental paradoxes of government under law-the illegal
operations of legally constituted government agencies.' 23 Legal Services lawyers
routinely oppose welfare departments that refuse to obey laws requiring prompt
provision of benefits and housing authorities which neglect their statutory duties to
repair public housing units.
The Legal Services lawyer sees perhaps the most significant harms that govern-
ment can inflict on human beings-deprivation of their means of life as well as injury
to their self-respect. It would be odd to prevent the LSC lawyer from deciding that a
law is unjust and acting on that decision, while at the same time compelling private
lawyers to seek improvement in the law. These disparate requirements would be
particularly incongruous in light of the Legal Services lawyer's statutory
responsibilities. Unlike the private lawyer's ethical obligation to the public at large,
the LSC statute focuses the Legal Services lawyer's ethical obligations specifically on
the poor. It obligates the lawyer to fulfill the statute's goals of improving the oppor-
tunities of the poor and of strengthening their faith in the legal system.
120. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrY EC 8-4 (1980).
121. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCt Rule 6.1 (1983), reprinted in 52 U.S.L.W. 1, 23 (1983).
122. See Stumpf, supra note 5, at 723-24. Perhaps the most poignant recent example is the Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC) provisions of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat.
357 (1981) (AFDC provisions codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). These provisions were touted in part for their
emphasis on getting people off welfare rolls and putting them to work to increase their self-respect. Actually, they had the
effect of encouraging the marginally employed to quit jobs to retain service benefits accompanying AFDC, such as
Medicaid, or because AFDC benefits were higher than the net gain from working. See Comment, The 1981 AFDC
Amendments: Rhetoric and Reality, 8 U. DAYTON L. REV. 81, 87 n.34, 91-92 (1982).
123. See Bellow, supra note 13, at 121; Denvir, supra note 55, at 1135; Stumpf, supra note 5, at 723 (quoting P.
WALD, LAW AND POVERTY: 1965, at 30-31 (1965), on welfare abuses of discretion).
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The second public obligation which affects case selection and strategy decision
is the lawyer's obligation to educate the public. The lawyer is obligated to improve
the public's understanding of the legal process and of its own legal rights.12 4 The
lawyer must fulfill this obligation either through community legal education meetings
or private discussions in which the lawyer exposes unrecognized legal problems of
those whom he or she encounters. In many respects the Code anticipates that the
public will be treated as a client. It is true that the lawyer is forbidden to use legal
education sessions to solicit clients for personal gain. 125 However, the lawyer's
obligations to provide competent advice and to suggest appropriate solutions to mem-
bers of the public parallel his or her obligations to accepted clients. 126
The obligation to provide legal education and advice is generally ignored by
private lawyers. When Legal Services staff members attempt to remedy the legal
ignorance of their clients by conducting the educational sessions suggested by the
statute, they are often accused of being "ideological ambulance-chasers."' 127 Part of
the neglect and mistrust of these community education efforts may stem from the fact
that lawyers and those who have used lawyers in the past assume that people with
legal problems know how to find a lawyer. Yet studies confirm that many middle-
and low-income people simply have too little information or do not possess the skills
to recognize when they need a lawyer. 128 In addition, their shared distrust of lawyers
often prevents these people from seeking legal advice 129 unless it is brought to them
in a personal, non-threatening way, such as through a community meeting. These
realities suggest that all lawyers, including Legal Services attorneys, must not wait to
see who walks through their doors, but must seek out those traditionally underserved
by the profession in order to help them discover their legal problems and find appro-
priate solutions. Those handicapped in their ability to find lawyers because of mental,
physical, linguistic, transportation or financial limitations deserve special attention
from the legal profession if equal access is really to be achieved.
130
A third public obligation of lawyers is to make services available to all those
needing legal assistance. 3 1 As we have suggested, the profession allows lawyers
great latitude in shaping their practices according to their own skills and interests. Yet
the ethics of the profession do not contemplate, as equal access proponents suggest,
that the private lawyer may simply turn his or her back on a case for any reason
whatsoever. 132 Rather, the Code underlines the lawyer's obligation to ensure in-
124. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-1, 2-2 (1980).
125. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-3, DR 2-104; MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CON-
DUcr Rule 7.3 (1983), reprinted in 52 U.S.L.W. 1, 24 (1983).
126. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY EC 2-1, 2-2 & n.4 (1980); cf. EC 2-5 & n. 10 (discussing
general solutions in public fora prohibited when individual facts may vary).
127. Ronald Reagan, quoted in S.F. Chron., Apr. 28, 1971, at 1, col. 4, 20, col. 6, quoted in Falk & Pollak, supra
note 12, at 615; see also 127 CONG. REC. H3016 (daily ed. June 17, 1981) (statement of Rep. Collins).
128. SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO SURVEY LEGAL NEEDS, AMERICAN BAR AaS'N, FINAL REPORT 53-54 (1978).
129. Id. at 55; Developments, supra note 101, at 1402 n.32.
130. See 42 U.S.C. § 2996f(a)(2)(C) (Supp. V 1981); Wexler, supra note 22, at 1055; infra note 145 and
accompanying text.
131. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 2 (1980); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rules 6.1, 6.2 (1983), reprinted in 52 U.S.L.W. 1, 23 (1983).
132. See Breger, supra note 16, at 311, 326-28; Kettleson, supra note 68, at 112 & n.2.
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dividuals equal access to the legal system by insisting that lawyers not decline
employment lightly or for personal reasons. 133 Similarly, the Model Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct require acceptance of the very kinds of cases that the lawyer might
be most inclined to reject: those in which the client is unable to pay a fee or those
involving unpopular clients or causes which might adversely affect the lawyer's
relationship with judges, members of the bar, and important public figures. 134 While
each lawyer is not expected to take all indigent clients or unpopular causes with
which he or she is confronted, the mere facts of a client's indigency or unpopularity
are not grounds to decline representation, absent compelling considerations such as
the lawyer's inability to represent that client properly.'
35
Admittedly, the obligation to accept indigent, unpopular, or repugnant clients is
often not respected in practice. Yet it remains an established, significant element of
both the Code and the new Model Rules. By arguing that private lawyers, unlike
Legal Services lawyers, may decline cases for any reason, equal access proponents
do violence to what the Code and the LSC statute seek to achieve-'response to all
needs for legal assistance regardless of who is paying the bill. Moreover, by suggest-
ing that the Legal Services lawyer may not exercise his or her judgment in accepting
cases, equal access proponents frustrate their own purpose of making equal access
available to all.
The Legal Services case selection process represents a particularly appropriate
way for the Legal Services lawyer to fulfill his or her obligation to improve the law,
to educate the public, and to make legal services available. The LSC statute not only
stresses the need to ensure equal access to the justice system, as equal access pro-
ponents seem to claim. It also suggests that Legal Services programs serve worthy
utilitarian purposes-the promotion of justice and the improvement of the status of
the poor. 136 These statutory goals cannot be met unless clients are educated to know
their rights and both clients and attorneys work together for changes in the law that
will improve poor people's opportunities. Thus, rather than counseling abstinence in
judging the fairness of the laws which affect clients' cases, the statutory goals suggest
that the LSC lawyer must make reasoned evaluations of these cases and their potential
for improving the law.
133. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-26, 2-27, 2-28, 2-29 (1980) (prohibiting refusal of a
case because the client is unable to pay or the cause is unpopular). Other Legal Services restrictions, such as the proposed
ban on representation in gay and lesbian rights cases and provision of abortion advice, have been criticized as unethical for
this reason. See 127 CONG. REc. H3075, 3090 (daily ed. June 18, 1981) (statement of Rep. Leach). The obligation not to
refuse a case because the client or cause poses particular problems for the public interest lawyer who operates within a
corporation or association formed to meet particular legal needs. See Bellow & Kettleson, supra note 75, at 343-53.
134. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucr Rule 6.2 and comments (1983), reprinted in 52 U.S.L.W. 1, 23
(1983); see MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILrrY EC 2-25, 2-27, 2-28 (1980).
135. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 6.2 and comments (1983), reprinted in 52 U.S.L.W. 1, 23
(1983). This inability might result from an unreasonable financial burden imposed by the case, the client's cause being so
repugnant that it is likely "to impair the lawyer's ability to represent the client," conflicts of interest, or incompetency. But
see Breger, stupra note 16, at 322.
136. 42 U.S.C. § 2996(l), (3) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). Among the statute's stated purposes is that Legal Services
will help to improve opportunities for the poor, among which Congress originally included opportunities for education,
training, work, and a life "live[d] in decency and dignity." See Declaration of Purpose, Economic Opportunity Act, Pub.
L. No. 88-452, § 2, 78 Stat. 508, 508 (repealed 1981).
1984]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
Moreover, the case selection process meets the attorney's need to fulfill public
obligations for practical reasons as well. Statutory restrictions on LSC especially
hamper the Legal Services lawyer's ability to fulfill the obligation to improve the
law. The private attorney may be able to juggle these obligations by devoting some
time to unpopular clients and other time to trying to change unjust laws by serving on
bar or legislative committees or by working for candidates who support change. By
contrast, the Legal Services lawyer is prohibited from significant participation in
partisan politics and from spending working hours lobbying for legal change, unless
it is on behalf of a specific client in narrowly defined circumstances.
137
Arguably, the lawyer may pursue some of these obligations after hours. How-
ever, even if legislators could be persuaded to reschedule sessions, this kind of
lobbying would require most Legal Services lawyers to make hard choices since
much after-hours time is spent on behalf of additional clients whom the program
might not otherwise serve. Moreover, the very position which lends credibility to the
lawyer's views, his or her experiences as a Legal Services lawyer, is that to which the
statute forbids the LSC lawyer to refer in any lobbying efforts. If the Legal Services
lawyer is thus essentially precluded from seeking improvement in the law outside of
his or her work, the case for allowing time to integrate that obligation into his or her
job becomes strong, particularly when case acceptance decisions involve the very
illegalities the lawyer would otherwise attempt to remedy.
The obligations to improve the law and to make legal services available often
suggest only one avenue: accepting the case which can affect a class of poor people as
opposed to an individual poor person. In a world of scarce legal resources, group
impact litigation may be the only way to provide adequate relief not only to clients
who apply for services, but also to those served informally through education and
advice. As we have previously demonstrated, even those committed to serving only
individual clients who request help must recognize that filing a class action often
provides that client with the most competent, zealous representation. When addi-
tional demands of client groups and the legal system are figured into the case accep-
tance procedure, the use of the class action may often be necessary to assure the most
comprehensive impact on behalf of all interests.
Cases in which class litigation, rather than the purely individual orientation of
the equal access model, is the only means to fulfill public obligations are not hard to
find in Legal Services work. For instance, many states have general assistance or
poor relief programs which meet the ongoing basic needs of both the chronically poor
as well as those temporarily in need who are not covered by federal aid programs, for
example, unemployed, uninsured, unskilled persons without children. 138 Some of
these programs include work relief requirements, ostensibly designed to add some
137. 42 u.S.C. § 2996e(e) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (politics); see id. § 2996f(a)(5) (Supp. V 1981) (prohibiting
lobbying except where necessary in representing clients or on legislative request through formal channels); Smith v.
Ehrlich, 430 F. Supp. 818 (D.D.C. 1976) (unsuccessful challenge to political restrictions); Gest, supra note 1, at 67.
138. See Rosenberg, Overseeing the Poor: A Legal.Administrative Analysis of the Indiana Township Assistance
System, 6 IND. L. Ruv. 385, 387 (1973).
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dignity to the process of seeking public aid and to improve the marketable skills of the
recipients. Actually, these statutes are often admiministered by local officials using
subjective standards which make it difficult for the temporarily and permanently poor
to obtain benefits. 139 Poor relief officers often look for reasons to reject applicants to
save money, using the work requirement to discourage applicants. For example, poor
people may be required to prove they are looking for work by getting numerous
statements from potential employers denying them jobs. Yet they are not provided
help in obtaining transportation and clothing necessary for job hunting. They may
also be harassed about being lazy and unwilling to work, or asked to pay partially for
assistance through jobs, such as polishing courthouse doorknobs, that provide them
no skills for future employment.
If an applicant tells the Legal Services lawyer he or she was denied aid because
of an unwritten work requirement, the equal access view would limit the Legal
Services lawyer to negotiating with the poor relief officer or filing for judicial
review" for benefits due the client in the month he or she was denied help. Because
of the nature of the right infringed, the court will seldom order a remedy which will
protect that individual or others experiencing the effects of the same policy in the
future. Moreover, the lawyer will have no real way to stop future harassment.
If, on the other hand, the Legal Services lawyer takes seriously the duty to
improve the law and make legal services available, the information obtained in
representing other clients, as well as research into systemic defects, will be used in
deciding whether to take the case and how to pursue it. Such broadened inquiry may
uncover defects in the local officer's financing system which are contributing to the
denial of assistance, or harassment which has not been sufficient to make a legal
challenge in any individual case worthwhile. The lawyer may use knowledge
obtained in cases that were mooted when clients received jobs or other benefits.
Information from clients unwilling to file suit because they fear retaliatory depriva-
tion of their benefits or court proceedings, or publicity about their poverty may also
aid in the decision about case acceptance and strategy. This broad-based approach
may cause the lawyer to bring injured clients together to seek publicity or to protest to
higher officials. It may suggest that the lawyer seek changes in the financing system
or staff training which give rise to abusive treatment. If the lawyer approaches the
problem on behalf of all of these clients through group impact litigation or a class
action, the clients may receive more enduring, comprehensive relief than they could
have obtained individually. The attorney will also have fulfilled both his or her
obligation to rectify injustices in the benefit allocation system and obligations to
specific clients. The class suit, unlike the individual appeal, provides the vehicle for
more broad-based remedies attacking the causes, and not just the symptoms, of the
clients' injuries.
139. See id. at 391, 402-03, 417-18; see also Denvir, Controlling Welfare Bureaucracy: A Dynamic Approach, 50
No'RE DAME LAW. 457 (1975) (documenting similar problems in other welfare programs).
140. See Rosenberg, supra note 138, at 393.
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Statutory restrictions which limit the scope of relief that the Legal Services
lawyer may seek obviously interfere with the fulfillment of these public obligations,
especially when the obligations point toward group solutions to a classwide problem.
If the Legal Services lawyer must seek an alternative which provides more limited
relief, his or her fulfillment of one of these obligations must suffer. Of course, equal
access proponents might justify limits on these obligations out of respect for the
dignity and interests of clients.
C. The Client's Interests
Lawyers who are selecting cases and deciding strategy must carefully consider
both the client's interests and the lawyer's. Equal access proponents translate concern
for client interests into a blanket rule that all client/applicant demands for service
must be fulfilled without question until resources are exhausted, subject only to a few
minor exceptions. In formulating this rule, they make two mistakes about the client/
applicant's role in case selection. First, they assume that the client/applicant is the
person who walks through the door to request services. 141 But LSC client/applicants
include not only those who apply for services, but also those poor people who need
legal services although they have not specifically requested them. Any restrictions on
case selection unfairly limit the provision of services to this latter group and do not
necessarily help those client/applicants who actually seek services.
Equal access critics make a second mistake by assuming the client/applicant's
wishes must be fulfilled unquestioningly if he or she is to be given the respect due
him or her. The client/applicant's right to dignified treatment mandates that he or she
be fully informed and given the right to participate meaningfully in case selection and
strategy decisions, not necessarily that he or she be given ultimate freedom to decide
that his or her case will be selected. The client's right to meaningful participation can
be accommodated in the partnership model, even in the class action situation, by
negotiating an agreement that provides the client an even greater opportunity for
meaningful citizenship. 142 In contrast, statutory restrictions deny the client both the
right to be heard and the right to the other protections the Code offers: the right to the
lawyer's independent judgment, and to zealous, competent representation.
1. Who Is the Client?
When equal access proponents criticize Legal Services lawyers for group-
oriented case decisions, they usually assume that these lawyers should attend only to
the interests of those who have sought their services. The contention that group-
oriented decisions are irrelevant and even counterproductive to the client's in-
141. See, e.g., Breger, supra note 16, at 336-40.
142. In arguing for meaningful citizenship, we adopt Professor Karst's formulation in his discussion of the right of
equal citizenship based on the philosophy and structure of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution.
That right, Karst suggests, encompasses three intertwined values: the value of participation in the processes of government
and the moral decisionmaking of the community; the value of equal respect; and the value of responsibility for the
members of the democratic community. See Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term-Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under
the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 H. v. L. REv. 1, 5-9 (1977).
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terests 143 takes on more meaning if the LSC statute can be construed to benefit only
those who come through the door of the Legal Services office. In some cases affect-
ing a number of poor people, such as utility shutoffs in public housing, only a few
poor tenants will know to seek legal advice, and their interests can be served effi-
ciently through the joinder device. In other areas, ignorance, mistrust, handicaps,
geographical maldistribution of services, and community and even poor people's
attitudes toward seeking government assistance ensure that some legal problems of
the poor will rarely be brought to the Legal Services office. Thus, when welfare
programs are particularly abusive and threatening to recipients, transportation is
difficult, and recipients are ashamed of being poor, only a very small number of those
affected by the policy will dare to challenge it.
If clients are only those who apply for service, the Legal Services office can
quite easily meet the equal access goal of providing services to all who request them
simply by increasing access barriers. Legal Services offices, using the equal access
rationale to defend their failure to add branch offices, to increase outreach, or even to
provide enough telephone lines so that client/applicants can communicate with intake
personnel,'" could argue that they are serving as many clients as possible with their
resources. To inform others who have legal problems about the availability of ser-
vices and allow them access would be to require the Legal Services program to make
unnecessary choices about who should get services.
The LSC statute does not support such a narrow conception of who the Legal
Services client is. The statute shows special concern for those persons who may not
be able to come to the office. For instance, Congress specifically required LSC to
determine whether traditionally underserved groups, for example, veterans, native
Americans, migrants, rural poor, and language-disadvantaged minorities need special
attention in the provision of services. '4 5 It also required local programs to set priori-
ties with due consideration for special access problems. Furthermore, it mandated
that poor people's needs for outreach, training, and support services be included in
the allocation of legal services. 4 6 In the past few years, before survival became its
main concern, LSC made the problem of access a major priority. It has devoted
special resources to minority groups within the poverty community, funded backup
programs to address special legal problems, placed major emphasis on achieving
"minimum access" for all the poor in its funding requests to Congress, and spent
considerable money on studying the access problems of the disadvantaged groups
targeted by Congress and others.' 4 7 These efforts underscore a broader understanding
of who the client is than the equal access conception will admit.
143. See, e.g., Breger, supra note 16, at 295-96, 351-52.
144. Some offices have employed similar procedures to limit their intake, including instituting waiting periods and
changing office locations. See, e.g., id. at 303.
145. Pub. L. No. 95-222, § 15, 91 Stat. 1619, 1623 (1977) (not codified).
146. 42 U.S.C. § 2996f(a)(2)(C)(ii) (Supp. V 1981).
147. See, e.g., GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FREE LEGAL SERVICE FOR THE POOR-INCREASED COORDINATION,
CoMMuNrry LEGAL EDUCATION AND OUTREACH NEEEDo, H.R. Doc. No. 78-164, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); S.
HERR, THE NEW CLIENTS: LEGAL SERVICES FOR MENTALLY RETARDED PERSONS (1979); LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION,
OVERvIEW OF § 1007(h): SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND MEMNODOLOGY (1979); LEGAL SERVICES
CORPORATION, DLivERY SySms STUDY: A RESEARCH PROJECT ON THE DELiVERY OF LEGAL SERVICES TO THE POOR
(1977).
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Breger responds by claiming that the obligation to reach beyond those who seek
legal services extends only to providing knowledge about the availability of legal
services to other poor people. 148 Assuming that this knowledge makes it possible for
all eligible persons to apply for legal services, it seems unnecessary for the program
to make choices about which cases can best protect the rights of those who have not
applied. Group-oriented strategies, according to Breger, denigrate the rights to dig-
nified treatment of those who have applied.
There are three possible responses to the contention that the only permissible
way of attacking uneven demand for legal services is through outreach and support
services. First, the LSC statute does not support this position. The statute specifically
requires programs to evaluate the nature of the special legal problems of various
groups in deciding how services will be allocated. 149 While the statute does not
include criteria for deciding which cases are more important to the poor or which
groups' cases should be considered more significant, it does require local programs to
make these determinations as part of their case selection procedures.
Second, the outreach and support approach still requires the program to make
major value choices because of the scarcity of program funds. The economist's
world, in which everyone with equal knowledge is presumed capable of expressing
his or her desire for a good, assumes that such knowledge is free. Yet each dollar
spent in informing potential clients of available Legal Services is a dollar taken away
from direct representation of applicants. If completely adequate outreach and support
services were to be provided to all client groups, programs might have no money to
pay attorneys to represent such persons once they gained access. Moreover, given the
variety of barriers which inhibit the poor from seeking legal services, and the extent
of our ignorance about how to overcome them, the goal of providing all of the poor
with truly equal access to legal representation remains as elusive as providing them
with equal access to the courts. Accordingly, it is unfair to deny those poor people
who cannot obtain access to Legal Services the same legal protections as those
available to individuals with precisely the same legal problems who do gain access. If
the Legal Services lawyer makes allocation decisions without considering the in-
terests of those who do not come for assistance, these people are denied access in the
same way that the program withouttoutreachIservices denies access. Similarly, by
denying Legal Services clients and lawyers the right to file class actions or restricting
their abilities to represent groups, equal access proponents preclude those who cannot
achieve access to the Legal Services program from any legal relief.
Third, the random approach to allocation of legal services, which relies on the
client to seek representation but prevents group case selection considerations from
being used in allocating services, often serves no purpose for the client who does gain
access to the system. Provision of services to those who seek them on a random basis
excludes those poor persons who are to be protected according to the LSC statute.
However, as we have previously argued, group-oriented case selection procedures
148. Breger, supra note 16, at 336-40.
149. 42 U.S.C. § 2996f(a)(2)(C)(i) (Supp. V 1981); see also 45 C.F.R. § 1620.2(b)(2) (1983).
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help these people and do not necessarily harm those clients who in fact seek services.
Often, the client's individual interests will be better served by a class action or group
approach to a problem, merely because of the increased clout, public attention, and
broadened possibilities for relief which attend such actions. Restricting group-
oriented action thus harms those individual applicants who can benefit from such
action, as well as those who do not apply.
No less than the private attorney, the Legal Services lawyer has obligations to
poor persons who do not seek services at the office. Admittedly, an individual
applicant's wishes for service may at times conflict with the group's demands: in the
case we previously discussed, representing the group wishing to challenge utility
policies will result in denial of some service to the divorce client. The question then
becomes whether, even given the lawyer's public obligations and responsibility to
those client/applicants who do not obtain Legal Services representation, any one
applicant has interests in individual dignity which override the interests of those who
do not seek service. We next argue that the client's interest in individual dignity does
not require that he or she be given a veto in the case selection procedure, although his
or her interests must be seriously considered.
2. The Partnership Model
The equal access position assumes, on one interpretation, that the client/
applicant must be provided individual legal services without any evaluation of his or
her case or its potential impact on the poor as a whole if the client/applicant's right to
individual dignity is to be protected. 150 In contrast, we suggest that the client has a
right to full information and free participation in case selection and strategy de-
cisions. The paramount ingredient of the right to participate is the right of the
individual client to be heard concerning the special circumstances of his or her case.
This right can be accommodated within the attorney-client relationship, even in the
class action context, if the lawyer adheres to his or her ethical obligations.
The initial prerequisite to preserving client dignity in the lawyering process is
client enlightenment. The attorney, as advisor, must provide the client with a full
understanding of the legal framework and use predictive skills and his or her moral
perspective' 5 1 to inform the client's understanding of his or her actions and their
consequences. In the case selection process a right to full information implies stan-
dards governing case selection, and the staff and community interests on which they
are based. The knowledge provided by the attorney is fundamental to the exercise of
the client's rights of participation and of choice safeguarded by the Code. Without
appropriate counseling, consent to a proposed strategy cannot be informed.' 5 2
However, the client's newly acquired knowledge is valueless if the client cannot
150. See. e.g., Breger, supra note 16, at 295-97, 307-08, 349-52.
151. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-8 (1980); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 2.1 and comment (1983), reprinted in 52 U.S.L.W. 1, 15 (1983).
152. See generally Spiegel, Lawyering and Client Decisionmaking: Informed Consent and the Legal Profession, 128
U. PA. L. REv. 41, 72-123 (1979).
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participate both in case selection and case control. The partnership model of the
lawyer-client relationship requires not that the lawyer protect just his or her own
interests, but that all relevant facts and the client's values be considered. The client
must be fully heard, and his or her wishes must be carefully considered. The Legal
Services attorney may have to be exceptionally careful to encourage the low-income
client to express concerns. Otherwise, the client's fears may preclude his or her
participation as a partner in the case.
A Legal Services program which does not recognize the client's right to partici-
pate may violate the client's individual dignity at any stage in the proceeding. The
case selection committee which uses arbitrary criteria for selecting cases-for in-
stance, refusing assistance to all divorce applicants without children, regardless of the
facts--can deny the client/applicant's right to be heard. Such standards, though
useful guidelines, should not close off the client/applicant's right to plead the special
circumstances of his or her case. Similarly, in choosing criteria for case selection, the
Legal Services program must give due consideration to client concerns. Since the best
option, allowing client/applicants competing for service to participate with lawyers in
making case allocation decisions, is not practical, 153 the advice of clients during
priority-setting and at local board meetings deserves serious attention.
A Legal Services program can undercut the client's right to participate in strat-
egy decisions by failing to heed the client. The attorney may stereotype the client's
problem, believing that a simple solution can suffice. As a result, more crucial
problems may be buried by the attorney's haste to solve the problem which is most
familiar. 154 Similarly, if the attorney uses inappropriate strategies in handling the
case, the client will lose trust in the attorney and revert to the familiar pauper's
role-obeying orders instead of giving them, being acted on rather than acting on his
or her own behalf.
Unless the right to participate is kept firmly in the minds of both attorney and
client, the gap between their values and lifestyles might frustrate the client's partner-
ship role by imposing false goals on the process of solving the client's problem. For
instance, the Legal Services lawyer who represents a client in a neglect proceeding
may become frustrated when the client does not "obey orders" about finding a job,
securing a stable home, and, in some areas, conforming to a social conduct that is
morally acceptable to the welfare department and the courts. The attorney may
believe that the solution is to make the client see that his or her primary interest is in
getting his or her children back and that the client should regulate his or her behavior
accordingly. By ignoring whether return of his or her children is most important in
153. It would be impossible for all affected clients to meet on allocation decisions since the clients span great
geographical distances and request services over long periods of time. Moreover, they would have to be educated about
the magnitude of other clients' problems and the relief potentially available to each. It is also not clear that they, any more
than the non-poor, hold values that favor another person's greater interest above their own, even when this preference
maximizes the interests of all.
154. See, e.g., Bellow, supra note 13, at 108. Bellow documents that legal aid lawyers often impose their views of
the problem and solution, pursue only those problems known to be legal problems by the clients, and talk clients into
settling cases because of lack of time and experience, as well as pressure from legal peers. See also Hosticka, supra note
13, at 607-08.
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the client's hierarchy of desires and by disregarding the client's willingness to com-
promise to get immediate results, the lawyer preempts the client's role in the partner-
ship. True, without attorney participation, the partnership loses the benefit of the
lawyer's often accurate understanding of the norms of the court or of the agency
which will decide the client's case. However, without client participation, the
partnership loses the knowledge of the client's wishes and of his or her willingness to
take risks or to cooperate in order to realize those wishes.
In class action litigation, the need to preserve the partnership balance is even
more crucial. Most often the lawyer will have to raise the question of the class suit
because the client is unaware of its function or potential result. Often, the lawyer may
need to persuade the client that the client's chosen solution, which may involve
individual action, does not adequately protect his or her interests in the long run. Yet
such persuasion may be interpreted by the client to mean that his or her case will not
be handled if he or she does not consent to represent a class. The lawyer must then
walk a fine line between persuasion that will provide the client with an informed
perspective and influence that might coerce the client to adopt the lawyer's preferred
strategy at the expense of the client's own desires and interests.
Nevertheless, if truly equal negotiation and compromise can be achieved
through the partnership model, attorney and client can agree when the case is
accepted about who will be represented. This agreement can reflect both the lawyer's
public obligations and the client's right to dignified free choice. While a freely
reached agreement requires particular foresight by the attorney who must map out and
explain the potential direction of the case, it is achievable. To the extent that the
attorney sees divergences between the client's immediate desires and those of the
broader group that he or she may seek to represent, the lawyer must discuss that
divergence with the client and reach some mutual understanding about the im-
plications of that divergence on both the identity of the "client" and possible reme-
dies.
If an agreement can be reached, however, some of the potential conflicts be-
tween attorney, client, and class, which proponents of class action restrictions an-
ticipate, can be removed when the case is accepted.' 5 5 A client who has been com-
pletely informed about the consequences of a case decision, and has participated
freely in it has truly accepted the fiduciary role under Rule 23 as the class
representative, 156 and is bound by his or her obligation of loyalty and care to class
155. This is not to suggest that the conflicts that occur in a class case are always so simply resolved. Often, serious
disagreements between attorney and named plaintiff, or among class members, will reflect divergence in class interests
and class desires. See, e.g., Dixon, Representation Values and Reapportionment Practice: The Eschatology of "One-
Man, One-Vote" in Nomos X: REPREsENTATION 167-83 (1968); Rhode, supra note 97, at 1183-86; see also MANUAL FOR
COMPLEX LmnoArON § 1.42 (1982) (obligation of court to identify separate groups with conflicting interests and provide
appropriate representation); Developments, supra note 101, at 1453; Comment, Factors Considered in Determining the
Fairness of a Settlement, 68 Nw. U.L. REv. 1146, 1152 (1974).
156. This obligation adequately to represent the class emanates from due process rights of absent class members. See
Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42-45 (1940); Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. John Mohr & Sons, No.
80-C-2642 (N.D. Ill. June 25, 1980) (available on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); see also Boggess v. Hogan, 410 F.
Supp. 447, 448 (N.D. II1. 1976).
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members. Such a partnership approach will avoid many of the class conflicts which
have arisen in settings other than Legal Services. 57 The agreed objectives will
remind the client that he or she has relinquished some freedom to assure that his or
her own interests will be served. Moreover, both client and attorney will have agreed
at the outset that the attorney's obligation is not only to the individual but to the
client, that is, the class. 1
58
Thus conceived, class litigation implies a broader partnership for the benefit of
other poor people. The class representative invites the scrutiny of the court and the
lawyer, both of whom must determine that the litigation protects those class members
whose absence makes them vulnerable because they are not even heard. The private
communication within the attorney-client relationship becomes a decisionmaking
dialogue among all those entrusted with the class members' interests. In that process,
as in the attorney-client relationship, decisions are reached not by fiat but by com-
promise, based on a realistic assessment of the case. The communication between the
court, the plaintiffs attorney, and the named or intervening plaintiffs resembles
negotiation, permeated by a sense of responsibility to other class members. As a
freely assenting member of that dialogue, the client can realize goals shared with
other poor people to whom the Legal Services lawyer has ethical and statutory
commitments. As a partner, he or she also claims a more important right: in Professor
Karst's terms, the client's right to equal citizenship.' 5 9 Participation in such a suit
gives the client the chance to be a responsible "member of a moral community, who
counts for something in the community's decision-making process[,] . .. one who
owes obligations to his fellow members [of society]. '160 For the poor person, who
suffers humiliation, stigmatization, and loss of responsibility for his or her own
destiny and that of others through the twisted dependencies and indignities of the
welfare state, this small vindication of the client's right of equal citizenship may be
significant.
3. Statutory Restrictions
In contrast to the partnership model, which is flexible enough to allow the
client's interests to be heard, statutory restrictions on LSC significantly hamper the
client's right to participate. These restrictions not only limit the choices a Legal
157. Most class conflict cases involve settlement proposals to which named plaintiffs objected because the proposal
did not satisfy their personal demands for damages or back pay. See Kincade v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 635 F.2d
501, 508 (5th Cir. 1981), and cases cited therein; Hayes v. Eagle-Picher Indus., 513 F.2d 892, 894 (10th Cir. 1975); Air
Line Stewards & Stewardesses Ass'n, Local 550 v. American Airlines, 490 F.2d 636, 639-42 (7th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 993 (1974); cf. Bums v. United States Postal Serv., 380 F. Supp. 623, 629 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
158. See, e.g., Developments, supra note 101, at 1447-57, suggesting that the lawyer's obligation runs to each class
member, rather than to the class as an entity or the named plaintiff. See also Lewis v. Teleprompter Corp., 88 F.R.D. 11,
14 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
As many commentators have indicated, the role of an attorney is unique in that he or she acts without the consent of
the class and even over the objections of class representatives and members in order to safeguard the interests of the class.
The ethical obligations of loyalty and obedience therefore conflict at times. See Developments, supra note 101, at
1448-54.
159. Karst, supra note 142, at 5-9.
160. Id. at S.
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Services client may make, but also change the nature of the information the lawyer
will provide to, and seek from, the client. The essence of any informed client's right
of choice is the ability to command as many options for the resolution of his or her
case as possible. Forcing Legal Services attorneys to provide their clients with more
limited information or options than those available to non-poor clients, constitutes the
kind of denial of client participation which the Code prohibits.
Yet one might argue that statutory restrictions on a client's options to receive
legal services or pursue strategies are no different from restrictions imposed because
of the other demands of the partnership model. In the partnership model, the lawyer
will not simply acquiesce to an individual applicant's demands to be served, or to
have his or her chosen strategies pursued. Rather, the lawyer's interests, and obliga-
tions to the public and the poverty community, may suggest that the lawyer decide to
deny legal assistance to an individual client/applicant, or counsel a broader strategy
than the client/applicant wants to pursue. An equal access proponent would argue
that congressional denial of the client/applicant's ability to get help with an abortion
or desegregation case, or to file a class action, is no different since the client/
applicant is informed of the limitations and given assistance within them.
Yet statutory limitations deny the client's right to participate in a fundamental
way not present in negotiation of the partnership. Statutory restrictions do not allow
the client to be heard. These limitations are not premised on the client's recognized
need to be protected from the attorney's overreaching; rather, they preclude the
client's opportunity to argue that his or her case should be taken or that a particular
strategy should be pursued. The restrictions also fail to treat the client as a person to
whom attention must be paid, as a person who can change his or her mind. The
negative impact of these restrictions, ostensibly designed to protect clients, is clear.
Statutory restrictions not only prevent the client/applicant from being heard,
they also deny the client the other rights that he or she may demand under the Code of
Professional Responsibility. For instance, these restrictions may make even more
difficult the exercise of independent judgment in the client's behalf. In the Legal
Services context the staff attorney is already under pressure from his or her peer
group, including potential employers, judges, and other bureaucrats with educational
and cultural backgrounds similar to the attorney's to subjugate the client's wishes to
what he or she perceives is best for the client, or the legal system. 161 This pressure
causes attorneys to devalue the client's ability to understand and make competent
161. These pressures may be exerted against the program's funding or may be simply peer pressure that bestows
benefits or burdens on the basis of how smoothly the lawyer allows the system to function. Norms for professional
behavior, such as emotional detachment and commitment to individual treatment, exacerbate the gulf between lawyer and
client. Bellow, supra note 13, at 118-19. See also A. DEGRAZIA, PUBLIC AND RE'UBLIC 214-17 (1951); MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSlBLITY Canon 5 (1980); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 334
(1974), reprinted in 60 A.B.A. J. 1273 (1974); Informal Op. 307, 27 VA. BAR NEws 26 (1978) (if full representation of a
client requires filing of a class action, any limitations thereon by the Board of Directors are unethical); ABA Comm. on
Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1208 (1972) (law school clinic guidelines barring affirmative suits
against government, and particularly case-by-case decisions on these filings, conflict with the obligation of exercising
independent judgment and the obligation of loyalty); Advisory Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 218, 94 N.J. L.J. 801
(1971) (Board of Directors cannot dictate strategy in individual cases).
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decisions for himself or herself. The Legal Services lawyer also labors under heavy
caseloads, often has insufficient support on his or her cases, and sometimes lacks
experience. 1 62 When public condemnation embodied in a statutory restriction, such
as the prohibitions on class actions, is added to these pressures, the attorney is
unlikely to make decisions which provide the best and most comprehensive solutions
for the client. The restrictions also make the private attorney-client relationship a
public matter: the lawyer and client must answer to the special interest group that
opposes abortion, or the Congressman who does not believe the state should have to
pay millions of dollars in benefits because of one class action case. Each of these
political actors has been given a veto over the client's choice.
When the limitations on the client's options begin to affect the attorney's
willingness to provide the best service possible within the law, the requirements of
competence and zeal in Canons 6 and 7 are also implicated. 163 The Code requires that
advocates be both capable and willing to secure favorable results for the client.'
64
The requirement of zealous representation mandates that the lawyer use every means
within the bounds of the law to secure the client's chosen result. 165 Without zealous
representation, the rationale for the entire adversary system collapses because of
inequalities in advocacy and bargaining power. 166 If the Legal Services client is
deprived of options available to the opponent, the equalizing effects of providing
legal representation are destroyed.
Statutory restrictions which prevent Legal Services lawyers from achieving
favorable results for their clients erode the competent, zealous representation of poor
clients. "Rewarding" many significant victories of Legal Services clients only with a
prohibition designed to prevent further victories only breeds cynicism and dis-
couragement. Similarly, when court victories are overturned by legislative enact-
ments or when poor people are denied the opportunity to defend their gains because
Legal Services lawyers are precluded from lobbying, the demoralizing effect on
Legal Services lawyers is significant. To expect high quality zealous representation in
the face of such reactions is not realistic. Indeed, it would appear that restrictions on
representation in alien and school desegregation cases, passed in response to victories
won by aliens in working conditions and public benefit cases, and by blacks in
bussing cases,167 have slowed client gains in both areas. This cure, with its overbroad
prophylaxis, is worse than the disease in that clients are deprived of autonomy and
respect gained through direct involvement in their cases.
We have detailed how current equal access proponents in fact undermine the
rights of poor people to access to the legal system, and how their argument undercuts
162. Bellow, supra note 13, at 117-18.
163. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 6 (competence) and Canon 7 (zealous representa-
tion) (1980); cf. Cramton, The Task Ahead in Legal Services, 61 A.B.A. J. 1339, 1342-43 (1975) (loyalty and zeal).
164. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 6-4 (1980); see also MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCr Rules 1.1, 1.3, and comments (1983), reprinted in 52 U.S.L.W. 1, 3, 4 (1983).
165. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-1, 7-4; cf. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUcT Rule 1.3 and comments (1983), reprinted in 52 U.S.L.W. 1, 4 (1983).
166. See Joint Conference Report, supra note 117, at 1216.
167. See, e.g., 127 CONG. REc. H3093 (statement of Rep. Gaydos), H3103-04 (statement of Rep. McCollum)
(daily ed. June 18, 1981).
[Vol. 45:1
LEGAL SERVICES AND GROUP REPRESENTATION
the essential nature of the attorney-client relationship on which our system of legal
ethics is based. However, as a political weapon, the equal access position has been
wielded powerfully in recent months to impose unnecessary and punitive restrictions
on class actions on behalf of the poor. It is true that Congress has recently modified
these restrictions perhaps because of concerns that blanket restrictions on group
representation unduly interfere with the attorney-client relationship. The 1981 bill
which would have precluded all class suits against governmental entities was
amended to allow such suits, but only if they met rigorous prerequisites. 16 8 Yet even
these restrictions have not served any of the individual client interests emphasized by
the equal access proponents, nor have they served interests of other parties involved.
Thus, these restrictions have significantly curtailed Legal Services clients' rights to
full participation in their cases and full access to the courts without any corresponding
benefit.
V. THE RECENT CONGRESSIONAL DEBATE
Since the formation of LSC, its opponents have attempted to restrict the filing of
class actions on behalf of the poor, especially those directed against government
agencies. 169 For many years, supporters of LSC succeeded in preventing the adoption
of most of these restrictions. But the Reagan Administration's firm opposition to any
federally funded Legal Services program, even while it was appointing LSC board
members, 170 coupled with the recent conservatism in Congress, has given new life to
the efforts of LSC's established critics to restrict what Legal Services lawyers do for
clients. The 1981 reauthorization bill contained a host of procedural restrictions to
which the sponsors reluctantly agreed in order to save the corporation from de-
funding. 17 ' Although most of these amendments died in the Senate, restrictions on
lobbying and class actions have continually been included in refunding res-
olutions. 172 These restrictions further harm poor clients by placing them on an
increasingly unequal footing with other litigants without any corresponding benefit to
them or to potential defendants. The only winners are those who gain politically by
promoting ideologies designed to stave off any gains by the poor.
Prior to the 1981 debates on the LSC statute and reauthorization, Legal Services
lawyers who wished to file class actions on behalf of their clients needed only obtain
the approval of the local program director, who was restricted by the policies es-
tablished by the local program's board of directors. 173 Such safeguards sufficiently
168. See text of H.R. 3480, supra note 9, as passed by the House and amended by the Senate; H.R. REP. No. 980,
97th Cong., 1st Sess. 170-71 (1982); Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of
Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Seas. 602-32 (1982).
169. See, e.g., 120 CONG. REC. 1627 (1974).
170. See supra note 1.
171. See 127 CONG. REC. H2968 (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier), H2973 (statement of Rep. Dixon), H2975-76
(statement of Rep. Frank), H2982 (statement of Rep. Roybal) (daily ed. June 16, 1981).
172. See Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. 602-32 (1982); H.R. REP. No. 201, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. 3-4 (1982).
The provision limiting class actions has remained essentially the same as the amended version of H.R. 3480 that was
passed in 1982. Act of Dec. 21, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-377, 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEwS (96 Stat.) 1830.
173. 42 U.S.C. § 2996e(d)(5) (1976). This requirement applies to class appeals and any class actions in which the
program was indirectly involved. See also 45 C.F.R. pt. 1617 (1983); Mayer, The Legal Services Corporation Act, 1977
ANN. SURV. Am. L. 275, 294.
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protected the public against possible abuses by Legal Services attorneys. In 1981,
however, LSC's opponents were successful in attaching a restriction to H.R. 3480
which prohibited Legal Services programs from filing class actions against gov-
ernmental entities. 17
4
While that restriction was initially rejected by the Senate, 75 the rider to the 1983
continuing appropriations bill 176 adds four other requirements which make it very
difficult for a given program's director to authorize actions. The rider requires the
director to show, first, that the relief sought by the class action is for the primary
benefit of persons eligible for Legal Services assistance. Second, the project director
must determine, prior to filing the class suit, that the potential defendant agency is not
likely to change its policies or practices without suit. Third, the director must de-
termine that this policy or practice is one that will continue adversely to affect eligible
clients. Finally, the Legal Services program must give written notice of intent to file a
class action suit to the government entity and then make "responsible" efforts to
resolve the problems caused by the policy or practice. These last requirements must
be met prior to filing suit unless the project director determines that such efforts
would adversely affect the interests of the clients. 177
None of these restrictions is needed to protect the legitimate interests of clients
or adverse parties. They will certainly not deter the irresponsible attorney who op-
erates in an otherwise responsible Legal Services program, but they will stop class
actions for which local community members have seen the need. The previous re-
quirements that the local board of directors establish regulations for filing class
actions, and that the local director supervise and approve all such filings were suf-
ficient to deter individual irresponsibility. The local board, composed of community
attorneys, poor people, and others, 178 has enough knowledge of the local situations to
check any improper or unethical behavior on the part of LSC attorneys. Procedurally,
the board could require that the project director obtain the client's informed consent
before authorizing the suit. Substantively, the board could provide further restrictions
on filings as the need arises or even force an errant attorney to resign. 179 Further-
more, the project director, as an attorney, is capable of judging whether a case lacks
merit. As one who must be responsive to political realities, the director must engage
in such monitoring or risk losing funds if class actions are recklessly filed. 8 0 Thus,
the new restrictions can only be meant to curtail class action suits which the local
board and the project director do not believe illegal, unethical or frivolous.
Nor do defendants need any more protection than they enjoy under the old
provisions. The statute provides that a defendant who believes the class action was
not filed on behalf of eligible clients, or involved matters prohibited by the LSC
174. H.R. 3480 § 11, supra note 9.
175. See supra note 172; H.R. 3480, supra note 9.
176. Act of Dec. 21, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-377, 1982 U.S. CoDE CONG. & AD. NEws (96 Stat.) 1830.
177. Id. at 1875.
178. See 42 U.S.C. § 2996f(c) (Supp. V 1981); 45 C.F.R. § 1607.3 (1983).
179. See supra note 172 (guidelines set by local board); 45 C.F.R. § 1618.4 (1983) (termination of employment);
see also Mayer, supra note 173, at 279.
180. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 1606.3-.4 (1983).
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statute, can complain to LSC, which will investigate and allow formal charges
against the local program.'' Moreover, if staff attorneys file lawsuits on behalf of
ineligible persons, persistently incite litigation, or otherwise unethically solicit
clients, this appeal to LSC can result in the lawyer's dismissal or in termination of the
program's grant. 182
The court also plays a role in checking unscrupulous attorney behavior. In
addition to its powers to discipline an unethical attorney, a court can prevent harm to
a defendant by early dismissal of a meritless case or denial of class certification.
Furthermore, if a court decides that a suit was filed to harass the defendant or was an
abuse of process, the court may award the defendant attorney's fees against LSC. 183
In short, any action which strays from statutory or ethical mandates or any in-
substantial lawsuits can be easily checked without the 1983 rider's provisions.
Admittedly, defendant agencies are not safe from lawsuits which are successful or
which, though unsuccessful, are based on the reasonable belief that the client's claim
was valid. But protection against the uncertainty of the law is available to no one.
The 1983 rider also imposes unreasonable burdens of foresight on the project
director. First, he or she not only must determine that the policy or practice which
harmed the client is currently being implemented by the proposed agency defendant,
but also must predict whether it is likely to continue. Obviously, the only source of
information to make that decision is the defendant agency, the last source to which a
plaintiff's attorney should have to go without the benefit of sworn testimony or
discovery. Second, the director must also predict the future by deciding whether the
policy will continue adversely to affect his or her clients. Third, the director must
decide what responsible efforts at negotiating a settlement are, or decide that efforts
to negotiate would adversely affect his or her clients-two difficult judgments, es-
pecially since mistakes would put the life of the program in jeopardy. Finally, the
director must decide that the action will benefit primarily poor people. When an
action raises issues that probably affect not only the poor but also the non-poor, for
example, a challenge to the welfare department's policy of removing children in
neglect and abuse cases, or to a state agency's failure to enforce consumer protection
laws or utility rate increase procedures, the statute arguably might suggest that the
suit be disapproved if the defendant did not volunteer information about its impact on
the poor.
By contrast to the lack of protection the 1983 rider offers Legal Services clients
or their opponents, the harm likely to be caused by its chilling effect can easily be
illustrated by a hypothetical case drawn from actual Legal Services experience. The
federal Hill-Burton program has provided grants and low-cost loans to thousands of
private hospitals since the 1950's. 184 In return, the hospitals are required to provide
free or low-cost care to indigents for a period of twenty years, an obligation not
181. 45 C.F.R. §§ 1618.3, 5 (1983); see also id. §§ 1606.3(b), .4-.5.
182. 42 U.S.C. § 2996f(a)(4), (10) (1976) (prohibited activities); 45 C.F.R. §§ 1618.4 (termination of employ-
ment), 1606.4 (termination of funding) (1983); see also Mayer, supra note 173, at 279.
183. 42 U.S.C. § 2996e(f) (Supp. V 1981).
184. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 291 to 291o-I (1976).
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enforced by state or federal monitoring agencies until the late 1970's. In this hypo-
thetical case, a Legal Services program might receive complaints in all of its offices
that poor clients have been denied care or sued on bills from hospitals, and that the
state and federal agencies have made no attempt to enforce the provisions of the
Hill-Burton Act against the hospitals. Under the provisions of the 1983 congressional
rider, the program must provide notice of the possible lawsuit to potential state and
government defendants and make responsible efforts to negotiate a solution with
them. Several months might go by as the Legal Services lawyers present proposals,
and the hospitals and government agencies reject them.
In the meantime, clients will continue to be turned away by hospitals, and the
twenty-year free care periods for several hospitals begin to expire. The notice require-
ment has provided potential defendants, if they are unscrupulous, the chance to
destroy or alter their records, to speed up collection efforts against indigents, and to
moot the claims of, and intimidate, potential witnesses who may need to return to
these hospitals in the future. The negotiation requirement puts the Legal Services
attorney in a difficult position. If he or she decides erroneously that "responsible
efforts" to negotiate have been made and that a suit to enjoin those hospitals from
ending their twenty-year obligations and to force governmental agencies to begin
enforcement procedures should be filed, jobs and program funding will be at risk. If
the attorney continues to negotiate, hoping to find some solution which is acceptable
to defendants, clients will continue to be harassed about bills or denied needed
hospital care. Additionally, as time goes by, the case against the hospitals for actions
they have taken years ago may seem less urgent to the federal judge who will hear the
case, and the named clients may become discouraged or ineligible for services. The
witnesses may move, as many poor people do frequently, and the possibility of relief
for clients harmed in the past may become remote.
Of course, it can be argued that the negotiation requirement may be waived by
the director if under the statute the clients' interests would be adversely affected by
waiting. But the waiver requirement, along with the required certification that the
other requirements of the Act have been met, puts the director in a serious conflict of
interest prohibited by the Code of Professional Responsibility.' 8 5 Like the attorney
who holds a financial stake in the outcome of a client's case, the Legal Services
program director and the staff attorney are faced with the choice of acting assertively
for the client and risking loss of their jobs or program funding, or playing it safe and
jeopardizing the client's interest. The alternative-filing an individual action against
the governmental entity-may insufficiently protect the client's interest or in-
adequately restore some balance of power between the client and the agency whose
action is being challenged.
185. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 5, especially DR 5-101(A) (1980). DR 5-107 prohibits
lawyers from allowing third parties, even those who pay for the legal services in question, to "direct or regulate [the
lawyer's] professional judgment in rendering such legal services"; see also EC 5-21 (pressures may include political
pressures) and EC 5-24 (legal aid lawyer should not allow board interference in the lawyer-client relationship); MODEL
RuLES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuCr Rule 1.7(b) and comment (1983), reprinted in 52 U.S.L.W. 1, 7-8 (1983); cf. Rule
2.3 (evaluation of case for use of third person).
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Ironically, the new restrictions imply that the Legal Services attorney's motives
are usually under suspicion and that the government official's are regarded as pure.
Yet, if both are acting responsibly for their clients, any sincere difference of opinion
regarding the legality of defendant's conduct will have been discussed in state admin-
istrative hearings, which are almost always required by federal exhaustion and state
judicial review doctrines prior to the filing of lawsuits. If the defendant agrees that
the policy or practice is illegal at that juncture, it will presumably be changed. If not,
the requirements of notice and negotiation waste precious time. If the Legal Services
lawyer acts improperly, the local program, the court, and LSC all have sanction
mechanisms. If on the other hand, the agency that is the potential defendant is acting
in bad faith, the new provisions will strengthen its ability to stall a final judgment, to
alter incriminating evidence, and to tip the balance of power in later negotiations by
means of threats against the lawyer or the program. Similar efforts to harass poor
clients by challenging their eligibility for representation were so successful that
Congress finally prohibited these challenges except by administrative appeal. 186 Un-
fortunately, the 1983 rider resurrects the specter of harassment.
VI. CONCLUSION
As we have argued, the poor have a strong interest in publicly funded legal
assistance in civil cases, despite the fact that the Supreme Court and other branches of
the federal government have not recognized this interest as fundamental. Given the
nature of their opponents and the deprivations which the poor face, their interests in
civil legal assistance parallel the already recognized interest in obtaining legal repre-
sentation in criminal cases. However, the scarcity of services resulting from gov-
ernmental failure to extend counsel to the poor in civil cases has split defenders of
publicly funded legal assistance into two camps. Those who espouse the equal access
model stress individual procedural rights in allocation of legal services and in making
strategy decisions. Those who defend the law reform model stress the welfare in-
terests of the poor as a group. Yet both these models are often consistent with
group-oriented approaches to legal assistance for the poor.
Group-oriented case selection procedures currently employed by Legal Services
offices do not violate the rights of individual poor clients. As we have indicated, the
right of equal access to the legal system is not a procedural right which is easily
distinguished from a welfare right; hence, it is not necessarily at odds with group-
oriented selection procedures. Moreover, respect for individual dignity neither man-
dates random distribution of legal services, nor prevents consideration of the numbers
of people whose rights claims are affected by allocation decisions. Group-oriented
approaches to legal services recognize that the poor have common interests and are
subjected to class treatment, a reality that suggests the desirability of group legal
responses.
186. 42 U.S.C. § 2996e(b)(1)(B) (Supp. V 1981); 123 CONG. REC. 11,177-78; 38,160 (1977). Forcases that turned
back challenges to Legal Services representation, see, e.g., McManama v. Lukhard, 616 F.2d 727, 729-30 (4th Cir.
1980); Holland v. Steele, 92 F.R.D. 58, 60-62 (N.D. Ga. 1981); Anderson v. Redman, 474 F. Supp. 511, 517-20 (D.
Del. 1979); Martens v. Hall, 444 F. Supp. 34, 35-36 (S.D. Fla. 1977).
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Moreover, group-oriented legal strategies, particularly class actions, are also
consistent with Legal Services lawyers' ethical and statutory obligations. The Code
of Professional Responsibility assumes that attorney and client are partners in the
provision of legal assistance, not principal and agent. In the partnership model the
lawyer's ethical obligation of public service and the client's right to dignified treat-
ment often cannot both be preserved without resort to group case selection and
strategies.
Finally, current congressional restrictions on class action representation and
hence on group-oriented case selection serve no useful purpose. Such restrictions
provide no more protection for individual clients or even for their opponents than
standing statutory provisions. However, they constrain the legal options available to
poor people and impede their access to the legal system on an equal footing with their
adversaries.
